(tome i. pp. 190- 193):  “The soldiers of Lapisse’s division gave loud expression to the most sinister designs against the Emperor’s person, stirring up each other to fire a shot at him, sad bandying accusations of cowardice for not doing it.”  He heard it all as plainly as we did, and seemed as if be did not care a bit for it, but “sent the division into good quarters, when the men were as enthusiastic as they were formerly mutinous.”  In 1796 d’Entraigues, the Bourbon spy, reports, “As a general rule, the French soldier grumbles and is discontented.  He accuses Bonaparte of being a thief and a rascal.  But to-morrow the very same soldier will obey him blindly” (Iung’s Bonaparte, tome iii. p. 152).]—­

The illusion of the expedition had disappeared, and only its reality remained.  What bitter murmuring have I not heard from Murat, Lannes, Berthier, Bessieres, and others!  Their complaints were, indeed, often so unmeasured as almost to amount to sedition.  This greatly vexed Bonaparte, and drew from him severe reproaches and violent language.

—­[Napoleon related at St. Helena that in a fit of irritation he rushed among a group of dissatisfied generals, and said to one of them, who was remarkable for his stature, “you have held seditious language; but take care I do not perform my duty.  Though you are five feet ten inches high, that shall not save you from being shot.”—­Bourrienne.]—­

When the news arrived of the loss of the fleet, discontent increased.  All who had acquired fortunes under Napoleon now began to fear that they would never enjoy them.  All turned their thoughts to Paris, and its amusements, and were utterly disheartened at the idea of being separated from their homes and their friends for a period, the termination of which it was impossible to foresee.

The catastrophe of Aboukir came like a thunderbolt upon the General-in-Chief.  In spite of all his energy and fortitude, he was deeply distressed by the disasters which now assailed him.  To the painful feelings excited by the complaints and dejection of his companions in arms was now added the irreparable misfortune of the burning of our fleet.  He measured the fatal consequences of this event at a single glance.  We were now cut off from all communication with France, and all hope of returning thither, except by a degrading capitulation with an implacable and hated enemy.  Bonaparte had lost all chance of preserving his conquest, and to him this was indeed a bitter reflection.  And at what a time did this disaster befall him?  At the very moment when he was about to apply for the aid of the mother-country.

From what General Bonaparte communicated to me previously to the 1st of August, his object was, having once secured the possession of Egypt; to return to Toulon with the fleet; then to send troops and provisions of every kind to Egypt; and next to combine with the fleet all the forces that could be supplied, not only by France, but by her allies, for the purpose of attacking England.  It is certain that previously to his departure for Egypt he had laid before the Directory a note relative to his plans.  He always regarded a descent upon England as possible, though in its result fatal, so long as we should be inferior in naval strength; but he hoped by various manoeuvres to secure a superiority on one point.