So far as I wish to notice the fifth and sixth sections, they may be considered together.  That the enforcement of these sections would do no injustice to the persons embraced within them, is clear.  That those who make a causeless war should be compelled to pay the cost of it, is too obviously just to be called in question.  To give governmental protection to the property of persons who have abandoned it, and gone on a crusade to overthrow the same government, is absurd, if considered in the mere light of justice.  The severest justice may not always be the best policy.  The principle of seizing and appropriating the property of the persons embraced within these sections is certainly not very objectionable, but a justly discriminating application of it would be very difficult and, to a great extent, impossible.  And would it not be wise to place a power of remission somewhere, so that these persons may know they have something to lose by persisting and something to gain by desisting?

[A man without hope is a most dangerous man—­he has nothing to lose!]

I am not sure whether such power of remission is or is not in section thirteen.  Without any special act of Congress, I think our military commanders, when—­in military phrase, “they are within the enemy’s country,” should, in an orderly manner, seize and use whatever of real or personal property may be necessary or convenient for their commands; at the same time preserving, in some way, the evidence of what they do.

What I have said in regard to slaves, while commenting on the first and second sections, is applicable to the ninth, with the difference that no provision is made in the whole act for determining whether a particular individual slave does or does not fall within the classes defined in that section.  He is to be free upon certain conditions but whether those conditions do or do not pertain to him no mode of ascertaining is provided.  This could be easily supplied.

To the tenth section I make no objection.  The oath therein required seems to be proper, and the remainder of the section is substantially identical with a law already existing.

The eleventh section simply assumes to confer discretionary power upon the executive.  Without the law, I have no hesitation to go as far in the direction indicated as I may at any time deem expedient.  And I am ready to say now—­I think it is proper for our military commanders to employ, as laborers, as many persons of African descent as can be used to advantage.

The twelfth and thirteenth sections are something better than unobjectionable; and the fourteenth is entirely proper, if all other parts of the act shall stand.

That to which I chiefly object pervades most parts of the act, but more distinctly appears in the first, second, seventh, and eighth sections.  It is the sum of those provisions which results in the divesting of title forever.