For myself I can answer this question most easily.  I meant not to ask a repeal or modification of the Fugitive Slave law.  I meant not to ask for the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia.  I meant not to resist the admission of Utah and New Mexico, even should they ask to come in as slave States.  I meant nothing about additional Territories, because, as I understood, we then had no Territory whose character as to slavery was not already settled.  As to Nebraska, I regarded its character as being fixed by the Missouri Compromise for thirty years—­as unalterably fixed as that of my own home in Illinois.  As to new acquisitions, I said, “Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.”  When we make new acquisitions, we will, as heretofore, try to manage them somehow.  That is my answer; that is what I meant and said; and I appeal to the people to say each for himself whether that is not also the universal meaning of the free States.

And now, in turn, let me ask a few questions.  If, by any or all these matters, the repeal of the Missouri Compromise was commanded, why was not the command sooner obeyed?  Why was the repeal omitted in the Nebraska Bill of 1853?  Why was it omitted in the original bill of 1854?  Why in the accompanying report was such a repeal characterized as a departure from the course pursued in 1850 and its continued omission recommended?

I am aware Judge Douglas now argues that the subsequent express repeal is no substantial alteration of the bill.  This argument seems wonderful to me.  It is as if one should argue that white and black are not different.  He admits, however, that there is a literal change in the bill, and that he made the change in deference to other senators who would not support the bill without.  This proves that those other senators thought the change a substantial one, and that the Judge thought their opinions worth deferring to.  His own opinions, therefore, seem not to rest on a very firm basis, even in his own mind; and I suppose the world believes, and will continue to believe, that precisely on the substance of that change this whole agitation has arisen.

I conclude, then, that the public never demanded the repeal of the Missouri Compromise.

I now come to consider whether the appeal with its avowed principles, is intrinsically right.  I insist that it is not.  Take the particular case.  A controversy had arisen between the advocates and opponents of slavery, in relation to its establishment within the country we had purchased of France.  The southern, and then best, part of the purchase was already in as a slave State.  The controversy was settled by also letting Missouri in as a slave State; but with the agreement that within all the remaining part of the purchase, north of a certain line, there should never be slavery.  As to what was to be done with the remaining part, south of the line, nothing was said; but perhaps the fair implication was, it