And notwithstanding this plan, the recommendation that Congress provide by law for compensating any State which may adopt emancipation before this plan shall have been acted upon is hereby earnestly renewed.  Such would be only an advance part of the plan, and the same arguments apply to both.

This plan is recommended as a means, not in exclusion of, but additional to, all others for restoring and preserving the national authority throughout the Union.  The subject is presented exclusively in its economical aspect.  The plan would, I am confident, secure peace more speedily and maintain it more permanently than can be done by force alone, while all it would cost, considering amounts and manner of payment and times of payment, would be easier paid than will be the additional cost of the war if we rely solely upon force.  It is much, very much, that it would cost no blood at all.

The plan is proposed as permanent constitutional law.  It cannot become such without the concurrence of, first, two thirds of Congress, and afterwards three fourths of the States.  The requisite three fourths of the States will necessarily include seven of the slave States.  Their concurrence, if obtained, will give assurance of their severally adopting emancipation at no very distant day upon the new constitutional terms.  This assurance would end the struggle now and save the Union forever.

I do not forget the gravity which should characterize a paper addressed to the Congress of the nation by the chief magistrate of the nation, nor do I forget that some of you are my seniors, nor that many of you have more experience than I in the conduct of public affairs.  Yet I trust that in view of the great responsibility resting upon me you will perceive no want of respect to yourselves in any undue earnestness I may seem to display.

Is it doubted, then, that the plan I propose, if adopted, would shorten the war, and thus lessen its expenditure of money and of blood?  Is it doubted that it would restore the national authority and national prosperity and perpetuate both indefinitely?  Is it doubted that we here—­Congress and executive—­can secure its adoption?  Will not the good people respond to a united and earnest appeal from us?  Can we, can they, by any other means so certainly or so speedily assure these vital objects?  We can succeed only by concert.  It is not “Can any of us imagine better?” but “Can we all do better?” Object whatsoever is possible, still the question recurs, “Can we do better?” The dogmas of the quiet past are inadequate to the stormy present.  The occasion is piled high with difficulty, and we must rise with the occasion.  As our case is new, so we must think anew and act anew.  We must disenthrall ourselves, and then we shall save our country.