In the first place, what is necessary to make the institution national?  Not war.  There is no danger that the people of Kentucky will shoulder their muskets, and, with a young nigger stuck on every bayonet, march into Illinois and force them upon us.  There is no danger of our going over there and making war upon them.  Then what is necessary for the nationalization of slavery?  It is simply the next Dred Scott decision.  It is merely for the Supreme Court to decide that no State under the Constitution can exclude it, just as they have already decided that under the Constitution neither Congress nor the Territorial Legislature can do it.  When that is decided and acquiesced in, the whole thing is done.  This being true, and this being the way, as I think, that slavery is to be made national, let us consider what Judge Douglas is doing every day to that end.  In the first place, let us see what influence he is exerting on public sentiment.  In this and like communities, public sentiment is everything.  With public sentiment, nothing can fail; without it, nothing can succeed.  Consequently, he who moulds public sentiment goes deeper than he who enacts statutes or pronounces decisions.  He makes statutes and decisions possible or impossible to be executed.  This must be borne in mind, as also the additional fact that Judge Douglas is a man of vast influence, so great that it is enough for many men to profess to believe anything when they once find out Judge Douglas professes to believe it.  Consider also the attitude he occupies at the head of a large party,—­a party which he claims has a majority of all the voters in the country.  This man sticks to a decision which forbids the people of a Territory from excluding slavery, and he does so, not because he says it is right in itself,—­he does not give any opinion on that,—­but because it has been decided by the court; and being decided by the court, he is, and you are, bound to take it in your political action as law, not that he judges at all of its merits, but because a decision of the court is to him a “Thus saith the Lord.”  He places it on that ground alone; and you will bear in mind that thus committing himself unreservedly to this decision commits him to the next one just as firmly as to this.  He did not commit himself on account of the merit or demerit of the decision, but it is a “Thus saith the Lord.”  The next decision, as much as this, will be a “Thus saith the Lord.”  There is nothing that can divert or turn him away from this decision.  It is nothing that I point out to him that his great prototype, General Jackson, did not believe in the binding force of decisions.  It is nothing to him that Jefferson did not so believe.  I have said that I have often heard him approve of Jackson’s course in disregarding the decision of the Supreme Court pronouncing a National Bank constitutional.  He says I did not hear him say so.  He denies the accuracy of my recollection.  I say he ought to know better than I, but I will make no question about