unnecessary to distinguish nicely between the two sets of duties just mentioned, provided a consideration and special promise could be alleged.  Furthermore, as formerly the defendant’s public calling had the same effect as an assumpsit for the purpose of charging him in tort, it seems now to have been thought an equally good substitute for a special promise, in order to charge him in assumpsit.  In Rogers v.  Head, 1 the argument was, that to charge one in assumpsit you must show either his public calling at the time of the delivery, or a special promise on sufficient consideration.  This argument assumes that a bailee who received goods in the course of a public employment, [186] for instance as a common carrier, could be charged in this form of action for a breach of either of the above sets of duties, by alleging either his public calling or his reward and a special promise.  It seems to have been admitted, as was repeatedly decided before and since that case, that one who was not a common carrier could have been charged for non-delivery in a special action; that is, in case as distinguished from assumpsit.

Suppose, next, that the plaintiff sued in case for a tort.  As before, the breach of duty complained of might be such damage to property as had always been sued for in that form of action, or it might be a loss by theft for which detinue would formerly have been brought, and which fell on the bailee only by reason of the bailment.  If the goods had been stolen, the bailee’s liability rested neither on his common calling nor on his assumpsit and his neglect, but arose from the naked facts that he had accepted a delivery and that the goods were gone, and in such cases it ought to have been enough to allege those facts in the declaration. 1 But it was very natural that the time-honored foundations for the action on the case in its more limited application should still be laid in the pleadings, even after the scope of the action had been enlarged.  We shall have to inquire, later, whether the principles of Southcote’s Case were not also extended in the opposite direction to cases not falling within it.  The reasons for the rule which it laid down had lost their meaning centuries before Gawdy and Clench were born, when owners had acquired the right to sue for the wrongful taking of property in the hands [187] and the rule itself was a dry precedent likely to be followed according to the letter because the spirit had departed.  It had begun to totter when the reporter cautioned bailees to accept in such terms as to get rid of it. 1

Accordingly, although that decision was the main authority relied on for the hundred years between it and Coggs v.  Bernard whenever a peculiar responsibility was imposed upon bailees, we find that sometimes an assumpsit was laid as in the early precedents, 2 or more frequently that the bailee was alleged to be a common bargeman, or common carrier, or the like, without much reference to the special nature of the