it, and is thereby persuaded to act to his own harm.  This is no doubt the typical case, and it is a case of intentional moral wrong.  Now, what is the party’s conduct here.  It consists in uttering certain words, [133] so ordered that the utterance of them imports a knowledge of the meaning which they would convey if heard.  But that conduct with only that knowledge is neither moral nor immoral.  Go one step further, and add the knowledge of another’s presence within hearing, still the act has no determinate character.  The elements which make it immoral are the knowledge that the statement is false, and the intent that it shall be acted on.

The principal question then is, whether this intent can be reduced to the same terms as it has been in other cases.  There is no difficulty in the answer.  It is perfectly clear that the intent that a false representation should be acted on would be conclusively established by proof that the defendant knew that the other party intended to act upon it.  If the defendant foresaw the consequence of his acts, he is chargeable, whether his motive was a desire to induce the other party to act, or simply an unwillingness for private reasons to state the truth.  If the defendant knew a present fact (the other party’s intent), which, according to common experience, made it likely that his act would have the harmful consequence, he is chargeable, whether he in fact foresaw the consequence or not.

In this matter the general conclusion follows from a single instance.  For the moment it is admitted that in one case knowledge of a present fact, such as the other party’s intent to act on the false statement, dispenses with proof of an intent to induce him to act upon it, it is admitted that the lesser element is all that is necessary in the larger compound.  For intent embraces knowledge sufficing for foresight, as has been shown.  Hence, when you prove intent you prove knowledge, and intent may often [134] be the easier to prove of the two.  But when you prove knowledge you do not prove intent.

It may be said, however, that intent is implied or presumed in such a case as has been supposed.  But this is only helping out a false theory by a fiction.  It is very much like saying that a consideration is presumed for an instrument under seal; which is merely a way of reconciling the formal theory that all contracts must have a consideration with the manifest fact that sealed instruments do not require one.  Whenever it is said that a certain thing is essential to liability, but that it is conclusively presumed from something else, there is always ground for suspicion that the essential clement is to be found in that something else, and not in what is said to be presumed from it.

With regard to the intent necessary to deceit, we need not stop with the single instance which has been given.  The law goes no farther than to require proof either of the intent, or that the other party was justified in inferring such intention.  So that the whole meaning of the requirement is, that the natural and manifest tendency of the representation, under the known circumstances, must have been to induce the opinion that it was made with a view to action, and so to induce action on the faith of it.  The standard of what is called intent is thus really an external standard of conduct under the known circumstances, and the analysis of the criminal law holds good here.