Returning first to the case of the thorns in the Year Book, 1 it will be seen that the falling of the thorns into the plaintiff’s close, although a result not wished by the defendant, was in no other sense against his will.  When he cut the thorns, he did an act which obviously and necessarily would have that consequence, and he must be taken to have foreseen and not to have prevented it.  Choke, C. J. says, “As to what was said about their falling in, ipso invito, that is no plea, but he ought to show that he could not do it in any other way, or that he did all in his power to keep them out”; and both the judges put the unlawfulness of the entry upon the plaintiff’s land as a consequence of the unlawfulness of dropping the thorns there.  Choke admits that, if the thorns or a tree had been blown over upon the plaintiff’s land, the defendant might have entered to get them.  Chief Justice Crew says of this case, in Millen v.  Fawdry, 2 that the opinion was that “trespass lies, because he did not plead that he did his best endeavor to hinder their falling there; yet this was a hard case.”  The statements of law by counsel in argument may be left on one side, although Brian is quoted and mistaken for one of the judges by Sir William Blackstone, in Scott v.  Shepherd.

The principal authorities are the shooting cases, and, as shooting is an extra- hazardous act, it would not be surprising if it should be held that men do it at their peril in public places.  The liability has been put on the general ground of fault, however, wherever the line of necessary [104] precaution may be drawn.  In Weaver v.  Ward, 1 the defendant set up that the plaintiff and he were skirmishing in a trainband, and that when discharging his piece he wounded the plaintiff by accident and misfortune, and against his own will.  On demurrer, the court says that “no man shall be excused of a trespass, ... except it may be judged utterly without his fault.  As if a man by force take my hand and strike you, or if here the defendant had said, that the plaintiff ran cross his piece when it was discharging, or had set forth the case with the circumstances so as it had appeared to the court that it had been inevitable, and that the defendant had committed no negligence to give occasion to the hurt.”  The later cases simply follow Weaver v.  Ward.

The quotations which were made above in favor of the strict doctrine from Sir T. Raymond, in Bessey v.  Olliot, and from Sir William Blackstone, in Scott v.  Shepherd, are both taken from dissenting opinions.  In the latter case it is pretty clear that the majority of the court considered that to repel personal danger by instantaneously tossing away a squib thrown by another upon one’s stall was not a trespass, although a new motion was thereby imparted to the squib, and the plaintiff’s eye was put out in consequence.  The last case cited above, in stating the arguments for absolute responsibility, was Leame v.  Bray.