It will be remembered that the fact formerly sworn to by the transaction witnesses was a benefit to the defendant, namely, a delivery of the things sold or the money lent to him.  Such cases, also, offer the most obvious form of consideration.  The natural question is, what the promisor was to have for his promise. 2 It is only by analysis that the supposed policy of the law is seen to be equally satisfied by a detriment incurred by the promisee.  It therefore not unnaturally happened that the judges, when they first laid down the law that there must be quid pro quo, were slow to recognize a detriment to the contractee as satisfying the requirement which had been laid down.  In the case which I have mentioned some of the judges were inclined to hold that getting rid of his daughter was a sufficient benefit to the defendant to make him a debtor for the money which he promised; and there was even some hint of the opinion, that marrying the lady was a [269] consideration, because it was a detriment to the promisee. 1 But the other opinion prevailed, at least for a time, because the defendant had had nothing from the plaintiff to raise a debt. 2

So it was held that a service rendered to a third person upon the defendant’s request and promise of a reward would not be enough, 3 although not without strong opinions to the contrary, and for a time the precedents were settled.  It became established law that an action of debt would only lie upon a consideration actually received by and enuring to the benefit of the debtor.

It was, however, no peculiarity of either the action or contract of debt which led to this view, but the imperfectly developed theory of consideration prevailing between the reigns of Henry VI. and Elizabeth.  The theory the same in assumpsit, 4 and in equity. 5 Wherever consideration was mentioned, it was always as quid pro quo, as what the contractor was to have for his contract.

Moreover, before consideration was ever heard of, debt was the time-honored remedy on every obligation to pay money enforced by law, except the liability to damages for a wrong. 6 It has been shown already that a surety could be sued in debt until the time of Edward III. without a writing, yet a surety receives no benefit from the dealing with his principal.  For instance, if a man sells corn to A, [270] and B says, “I will pay if A does not,” the sale does B no good so far as appears by the terms of the bargain.  For this reason, debt cannot now be maintained against a surety in such a case.

It was not always so.  It is not so to this day if there is an obligation under seal.  In that case, it does not matter how the obligation arose, or whether there was any consideration for it or not.  But a writing was a more general way of establishing a debt in Glanvill’s time than witness, and it is absurd to determine the scope of the action by considering only a single class of debts enforced