of persons in certain specified ways; while the power of removing or enforcing this limitation which is generally confided to certain other private persons, or, in other words, a right corresponding to the burden, is not a necessary or universal correlative.  Again, a large part of the advantages enjoyed by one who has a right are not created by the law.  The law does not enable me to use or abuse this book which lies before me.  That is a physical power which I have without the aid of the law.  What the law does is simply to prevent other men to a greater or less extent from interfering with my use or abuse.  And this analysis and example apply to the case of possession, as well as to ownership.

Such being the direct working of the law in the case of possession, one would think that the animus or intent most nearly parallel to its movement would be the intent of which we are in search.  If what the law does is to exclude others from interfering with the object, it would seem that the intent which the law should require is an intent to exclude others.  I believe that such an intent is all that the common law deems needful, and that on principle no more should be required.

It may be asked whether this is not simply the animus domini looked at from the other side.  If it were, it would nevertheless be better to look at the front of the shield than at the reverse.  But it is not the same if we give to the animus domini the meaning which the Germans give it, and which denies possession to bailees in general.  The intent to appropriate or deal with a thing as owner can [221] hardly exist without an intent to exclude others, and something more; but the latter may very well be where there is no intent to hold as owner.  A tenant for years intends to exclude all persons, including the owner, until the end of his term; yet he has not the animus domini in the sense explained.  Still less has a bailee with a lien, who does not even mean to use, but only to detain the thing for payment.  But, further, the common law protects a bailee against strangers, when it would not protect him against the owner, as in the case of a deposit or other bailment terminable at pleasure; and we may therefore say that the intent even to exclude need not be so extensive as would be implied in the animus domini.  If a bailee intends to exclude strangers to the title, it is enough for possession under our law, although he is perfectly ready to give the thing up to its owner at any moment; while it is of the essence of the German view that the intent must not be relative, but an absolute, self-regarding intent to take the benefit of the thing.  Again, if the motives or wishes, and even the intentions, most present to the mind of a possessor, were all self-regarding, it would not follow that the intent toward others was not the important thing in the analysis of the law.  But, as we have seen, a depositary is a true possessor under the common-law theory, although his intent is not self-regarding, and he holds solely for the benefit of the owner.