“Yes,” I said, “for the love of God!”

But to these words I hearkened in vain for a reply.  I grew impatient.  I called aloud —

    “Fortunato!”

    No answer.  I called again —

    “Fortunato!”

No answer still.  I thrust a torch through the remaining aperture and let it fall within.  There came forth in return only a jingling of the bells.  My heart grew sick — on account of the dampness of the catacombs.  I hastened to make an end of my labor.  I forced the last stone into its position; I plastered it up.  Against the new masonry I re-erected the old rampart of bones.  For the half of a century no mortal has disturbed them. In pace requiescat!

~~~ End of Text ~~~

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THE IMP OF THE PERVERSE

IN THE consideration of the faculties and impulses —­ of the prima mobilia of the human soul, the phrenologists have failed to make room for a propensity which, although obviously existing as a radical, primitive, irreducible sentiment, has been equally overlooked by all the moralists who have preceded them.  In the pure arrogance of the reason, we have all overlooked it.  We have suffered its existence to escape our senses, solely through want of belief —­ of faith; —­ whether it be faith in Revelation, or faith in the Kabbala.  The idea of it has never occurred to us, simply because of its supererogation.  We saw no need of the impulse —­ for the propensity.  We could not perceive its necessity.  We could not understand, that is to say, we could not have understood, had the notion of this primum mobile ever obtruded itself; —­ we could not have understood in what manner it might be made to further the objects of humanity, either temporal or eternal.  It cannot be denied that phrenology and, in great measure, all metaphysicianism have been concocted a priori.  The intellectual or logical man, rather than the understanding or observant man, set himself to imagine designs —­ to dictate purposes to God.  Having thus fathomed, to his satisfaction, the intentions of Jehovah, out of these intentions he built his innumerable systems of mind.  In the matter of phrenology, for example, we first determined, naturally enough, that it was the design of the Deity that man should eat.  We then assigned to man an organ of alimentiveness, and this organ is the scourge with which the Deity compels man, will-I nill-I, into eating.  Secondly, having settled it to be God’s will that man should continue his species, we discovered an organ of amativeness, forthwith.  And so with combativeness, with ideality, with causality, with constructiveness, —­ so, in short, with every organ, whether representing a propensity, a moral sentiment, or a faculty of the pure intellect.  And in these arrangements of the Principia of human action, the Spurzheimites, whether right or wrong, in part, or upon the whole, have but followed, in principle, the footsteps of their predecessors:  deducing and establishing every thing from the preconceived destiny of man, and upon the ground of the objects of his Creator.