has been demonstrated.  But whoever goes to war with England must not look to one battleground alone.  On the contrary, we must be prepared for attacks of the most varied kinds, for an attack upon our finances, to begin with, and upon our credit, as to which His Excellency Witte could give better information than I could.  The Bank of England, and the great banking firms allied with it, would at once open this financial campaign.  Moreover, a ship sailing under the Russian flag would hardly dare show itself on the open seas, and our international trade would, until our enemy had been crushed, be absolutely at a standstill.  Moreover, more vital for us than considerations of this sort would be the question:  What of the attitude of the other great Powers?  England’s political art has, since the days of Oliver Cromwell, displayed itself chiefly in adroitly making use of the continental Powers.  It is no exaggeration to say that England’s wars have been chiefly waged with continental armies.  This is not said in depreciation of England’s military powers.  Wherever the English fleet and English armies have been seen on the field of battle, the energy, endurance, and intrepidity of their officers, sailors, and soldiers have ever been brilliantly noticeable.  The traditions of the English troops who, under the Black Prince and Henry V., marched in days of yore victorious through France, were again green in the wars in the eighteenth century against France and against Napoleon.  Yet infinitely greater than her own military record has been England’s success in persuading foreign countries to fight for her, and in leading the troops of Austria, France, Germany, and Russia against each other on the Continent.  For the last two hundred years very few wars have ever been waged without England’s co-operation, and without her reaping the advantage.  These few exceptions were the wars of Bismarck, waged for the advantage and for the glory of his own country, by which he earned the hatred of every good Englishman.  While the continent of Europe was racked by internal wars, which English diplomacy had incited, Great Britain acquired her vast colonial possessions.  England has implicated us too in wars which redounded to her sole advantage.  I need only refer to the bloody, exhausting war of 1877-8, and to the disastrous peace of San Stefano, where England’s intrigues deprived us of the price of our victory over the Crescent.  I refer, further, to the Crimean War, in which a small English and a large French army defeated us to the profit and advantage of England.  That England, and England alone, is again behind this attack upon us by Japan has been dwelt upon by those who have already addressed you.  Our enemies do not see themselves called upon to depart in the slightest degree from a policy that has so long stood them in such good stead, and it must, therefore, be our policy to assure ourselves of the alliance, or at least, where an alliance is unattainable, of the benevolent