man was socially and religiously bound to avenge him by slaying the murderer or one of his kindred.  This duty of revenge is sometimes (and perhaps was at first everywhere) regarded as necessary to appease the ghost of the victim; sometimes as necessary to compensate the surviving members of his family.  In the latter case, it is open to them to accept compensation in money or cattle, etc.  Whether the kin will be ready to accept compensation must depend upon the value they set upon wealth in comparison with revenge; but for the sake of order and tribal strength, it is the interest of the tribe, or its elders, or chieftain, to encourage or even to enforce such acceptance.  It is also their interest to take the questions—­whether a crime has been committed, by whom, and what compensation is due—­out of the hands of the injured party, and to submit them to some sort of court or judicial authority.  At first, following ancient custom as much as possible, the act of requital, or the choice of accepting compensation, is left to the next-of-kin; but with the growth of central power these things are entrusted to ministers of the Government.  Then revenge has undergone its full transformation into punishment.  Very likely the wrong itself will come to be treated as having been done not to the kindred of the murdered man, but to the State or the King, as in fact a “breach of the King’s peace.”  This happened in our own history.

(4) The Comparative Method assumes that human nature is approximately the same in different countries and ages; but, of course, ‘approximately’ is an important word.  Although there is often a striking and significant resemblance between the beliefs and institutions of widely separated peoples, we expect to draw the most instructive parallels between those who are nearly related by descent, or neighbourhood, or culture.  To shed light upon our own manners, we turn first to other Teutons, then to Slavonians and Kelts, or other Aryans, and so on; and we prefer evidence from Europe to examples from Africa.

(5) As to national culture, that it exhibits certain ‘stages’ of development is popularly recognised in the distinction drawn between savages, barbarians and civilised folk.  But the idea remains rather vague; and there is not space here to define it.  I refer, therefore, to the classifications of stages of culture given by A. Sutherland, (Origin and Growth of Moral Instinct, Vol.  I, p. 103), and L.T.  Hobhouse (Morals in Evolution, c. 2).  That in any ‘state of Society,’ its factors—­religion, government, science, etc.—­are mutually dependent, was a leading doctrine with Comte, adopted by Mill.  There must be some truth in it; but in some cases we do not understand social influences sufficiently well to trace the connection of factors; and whilst preferring to look for historical parallels between nations of similar culture, we find many cases in which barbarous or savage customs linger in a civilised country.