The second lesson, if we may call it so, is closely allied, perhaps, to the first.  Shall we learn the lesson which is taught us in this recent war?  Shall we rest on the laurels which we may have won, or shall we prepare for the future?  Shall we not imagine our foe in the future, as might well be the case, to be superior to the one over which we have been victorious?  It is a question that comes home to us directly.  On July 3d, when Cervera was returned, on board the “Iowa,” to the mouth of the harbor at Santiago, he requested permission to send a telegram reporting the state of the case to Captain-General Blanco.  Of course, no objection was raised to this, and Cervera wrote out a telegram and sent it on board the flagship to be scrutinized and forwarded to Blanco.  He stated in this telegram that he obeyed his (General Blanco’s) orders and left the harbor of Santiago at 9.30 Sunday morning, and “now,” he said, “it is with the most profound regret that I have to report that my fleet has been completely destroyed.  We went out to meet the forces of the enemy, which outnumbered us three to one.”

I had so much sympathy with old Admiral Cervera that I did not have it in my heart to modify or change in any respect the report which he proposed to make to Captain-General Blanco.  I felt that the truth would be understood in the course of time, and that while I would not now, or then, under any circumstances, admit that he was outnumbered in the proportion of three to one, I still felt that he should be at liberty to defend himself in that manner.

The fleets that were opposed to each other on that Sunday morning were, as regards the number of the ships, about six to seven.  Leaving out the torpedo-destroyers and the “Gloucester,” which may be said not to have been fighting ships, the proportion was six to four.  The fleet of the Spaniards consisted of four beautiful ships.  I think I am stating the case within bounds when I say that they were—­barring their condition at that time, which, of course, we did not all know, in many respects—­that they were all our imaginations had led us to suppose.  We outnumbered them, but this is only another illustration of the fact which I wish to bring before you, that it is necessary to have a superior force to make sure of victory in any case.

It seems to me that you, gentlemen, who are so influential in determining and deciding what the Navy of the United States should be, should bear this emphatically in mind—­that we must have more ships, more guns, and all that goes to constitute an efficient navy.  I am not advocating a large navy.  I do not believe that we should support a large navy, but that it should be much larger than it is at present I think you will all concede.  The increased territory which we have added to our country will probably produce an increase in our chances for war by at least one hundred per cent.—­not that we need increase the Navy to that extent—­but probably will.