It comes to this, that no matter how great the majority by which a Liberal Government is supported, it is unable to pass any legislation unless it can procure the agreement of its political opponents.  Observe the position in which the present Executive Government is consequently placed.  Take only the question of passive resistance.  The action of the House of Lords at the present time forces the Executive Government to lock up in prison men with whose action they entirely sympathise and whose grievance they have faithfully promised to redress.  Such a position is intolerable.  Indeed, I am sure that if right hon. gentlemen opposite would only utilise that valuable gift of putting themselves in imagination in the position of others, they would see that no self-respecting men could continue to occupy such a position except with the object of putting an end to it for ever.

Much might be said for and against the two-Party system.  But no one can doubt that it adds to the stability and cohesion of the State.  The alternation of Parties in power, like the rotation of crops, has beneficial results.  Each of the two Parties has services to render in the development of the national life; and the succession of new and different points of view is a real benefit to the country.  A choice between responsible Ministries is a great strength to the Crown.  The advantage of such a system cannot be denied.  Would not the ending of such a system involve a much greater disturbance than to amend the functions of the House of Lords?  Is there not a much greater cataclysm involved in the breakdown of the constitutional organisation of democracy—­for that is the issue which is placed before us—­than would be involved in the mere curtailment of the legislative veto which has been given to another place?

I ask the House what does such a safeguard as the House of Lords mean?  Is it a safeguard at all?  Enormous powers are already possessed by the House of Commons.  It has finance under its control, it has the Executive Government; the control of foreign affairs and the great patronage of the State are all in the power of the House of Commons at the present time.  And if you are to proceed on the basis that the people of this country will elect a mad House of Commons, and that the mad House of Commons will be represented by a mad Executive, the House of Lords is no guarantee against any excesses which such a House of Commons or such an Executive might have in contemplation.  Whatever you may wish or desire, you will be forced to trust the people in all those vital and fundamental elements of government which in every State have always been held to involve the practical stability of the community.