“Such has been the system of this government, that the oppressions have generally originated with the aumils. They have been rarely selected for their abilities or integrity, but from favor, or the means to advance a large sum upon being appointed to their office. The aumil enters upon his trust ruined in reputation and fortune; and unless he accomplishes his engagements, which is seldom the case, disgrace and punishment follow. Though the balance of revenue may be rigorously demanded of him, it has not been usual to institute any inquiry for oppression. The zemindars, thus left at the mercy of the aumils, are often driven to rebellion. The weak are obliged to submit to his exactions, or fly the country; and the aumil, unable to reduce the more powerful, is compelled to enter into a disgraceful compromise. Every zemindar looks to his fort for protection, and the country is crowded with them: Almas Ali Khan asserts there are not less than seven hundred in his districts. Hence it has become a general custom to seize the brother, son, or some near relation or dependant of the different zemindars, as hostages for the security of the revenue: a great aumil will sometimes have three or four hundred of these hostages, whom he is obliged to confine in places of security. A few men like Almas Ali Khan and Coja Ain ul Din have, from their regularity in the performance of pecuniary engagements, rendered themselves useful to the Vizier. A strict scrutiny into his affairs was at all times irksome to his Excellency, and none of the ministers or officers about his person possessing the active, persevering spirit requisite to conduct the detail of engagements for a number of small farms, it became convenient to receive a large sum from a great farmer without trouble or deficiency. This system was followed by the most pernicious consequences; these men were above all control, they exacted their own terms, and the districts they farmed were most cruelly oppressed. The revenue of Rohilcund is reduced above a third, and Almas Ali Khan’s administration is well known to have been extremely violent.”
We will next read to your Lordships an extract from Captain Edwards’s evidence.
“Q. Had you any opportunity of observing the general face of the country in the time of Sujah Dowlah?—A. I had.—Q. Did you remark any difference in the general state of the country at that time and the period when you made your latter observation?—did you observe any difference between the condition of the country at that time, that of Sujah Dowlah in the year 1774, and the latter period you have mentioned?—A. I did,—a very material difference.—Q. In what respect?—A. In the general aspect that the country bore, and the cultivation of the country,—that it was infinitely better cultivated in 1774 than it was in 1783.—Q. You said you had no opportunity of observing the face of the country till you was appointed aide-de-camp


