It is not here, it is not on the physical, it is rather on the moral side, that the point of main offence is lying; in that excuse for evil and for evil men which the necessitarian theory will furnish, disguise it in what fair-sounding words we will.  So plain this is that common-sense people, and especially English people, cannot bring themselves even to consider the question without impatience, and turn disdainfully and angrily from a theory which confuses their plain instincts of right and wrong.  Although, however, error on this side is infinitely less mischievous than on the other, no vehement error can exist in this world with impunity; and it does appear that in our common view of these matters we have closed our eyes to certain grave facts of experience, and have given the fatalist a vantage ground of real truth which we ought to have considered and allowed.  At the risk of tediousness we shall enter briefly into this unpromising ground.  Life and the necessities of life are our best philosophers if we will only listen honestly to what they say to us; and dislike the lesson as we may, it is cowardice which refuses to hear it.

The popular belief is, that right and wrong lies before every man, and that he is free to choose between them, and the responsibility of choice rests with himself.  The fatalist’s belief is that every man’s actions are determined by causes external and internal over which he has no power, leaving no room for any moral choice whatever.  The first is contradicted by plain facts; the second by the instinct of conscience.  Even Spinoza allows that for practical purposes we are obliged to regard the future as contingent, and ourselves as able to influence it; and it is incredible that both our inward convictions and our outward conduct should be built together upon a falsehood.  But if, as Butler says, whatever be the speculative account of the matter, we are practically forced to regard ourselves as free, this is but half the truth, for it may be equally said that practically we are forced to regard each other as not free; and to make allowance, every moment, for influences for which we cannot hold each other personally responsible.  If not, —­if every person of sound mind (in the common acceptation of the term) be equally able at all times to act right if only he will,—­why all the care which we take of children? why the pains to keep them from bad society? why do we so anxiously watch their disposition, to determine the education which will best answer to it?  Why in cases of guilt do we vary our moral censure according to the opportunities of the offender?  Why do we find excuses for youth, for inexperience, for violent natural passion, for bad education, bad example?  Except that we feel that all these things do affect the culpability of the guilty person, and that it is folly and inhumanity to disregard them.  But what we act upon in private life we cannot acknowledge in our general ethical theories, and while our conduct