were also a manifest hindrance to the rapid execution of military maneuvers.  But, in spite of all difficulties, by evening of that day, the flank broke and gave way, and two entire corps from General von Buelow’s right were precipitated into the marshes.  Forty guns were taken—­to that time the largest capture of artillery made by the Allies—­and a number of prisoners.  Hundreds perished miserably, but General Foch held back his artillery from an indiscriminate slaughter of men made helpless in the slimy mud.  Thus ended the “Affair of the Marshes of St. Gond,” which broke still further the German right wing.

Thanks to General Foch’s further activities, General von Buelow had troubles upon his left wing.  When dawn of this same day or torrential rain, September 9, 1914, broke over the hill-road that runs from Mareuil to Fere-Champenoise, at which point lay the left of General von Buelow’s army, it witnessed a number of 75-millimeter guns on selected gun sites commanding the right flank of the German right center.  General Foch’s daring, the success of the maneuver, and the fact that the conduct of all the French armies on that day and the day following seems to be with the full cognizance of this venture, led inevitably to the conclusion that those brilliant feats, conceived by General Foch, had been communicated to General Joffre in time for the French General Staff to direct the French armies to the right and left of General Foch to cooperate with his action.  Had General Foch been less ably supported, his wedge might have proved a weak salient open to attack on both sides.  But General Foch’s main army to the west kept General von Buelow busy, and General Langle’s army to the east fought too stubbornly for the Duke of Wuerttemberg to dare detach any forces for the relief of General von Buelow.  General von Hausen’s Saxon Army was weak, at best.

What were the forces that operated to make this particular point so weak are not generally known.  As, however, the divisions from Alsace were much in evidence three or four days later, it is more than probable that these divisions were intended for service at this point, and also to reenforce General von Kluck’s army, but that, by the quick offensive assumed by General Joffre on the Ourcq, and, owing to the roundabout nature of the German means of communication, these expected reenforcements had not arrived.  The German official dispatches point out that General von Buelow’s retreat was necessitated by the retreat of General von Kluck.  Of this there is no doubt, but even military necessity does not quite explain why General von Buelow bolted so precipitately.  His losses were fearful, and the offensive of General Foch rendered it necessary for the Germans to fall back on the Aisne.