The French plan, is the next to be considered.  From official orders and dispatches and also from the developments of that week, it is clear that General Joffre had perceived the possibility of such a plan as the Germans had actually conceived.  He had brought back his armies—­and there is nothing harder to handle than a retreating army—­step by step over northern France without losing them their morale.  The loss of life was fearful, but it never became appalling.  The French soldiers had faith in Joffre, even as their faith in France, and, while the Germans had victories to cheer them on, the soldiers of the Allies had to keep up their courage under the perpetual strain of retreat.  The administration had evacuated Paris.  Everywhere it seemed that the weakness of France was becoming apparent.  To the three armies in the field, those commanded severally by General Manoury, Sir John French, and General Lanrezac, the generalissimo steadily sent reenforcements.  But he informed the French Government that he was not able to save the capital from a siege.  Yet, as after events showed, while these various conditions could not rightly be considered as ruses upon General Joffre’s part to lure on the Germans, there is no doubt that he understood and took full advantage of the readiness of the attacking hosts to esteem all these points as prophetic of future victory.  The first feature of the French plan, therefore, was to lend color to the German belief that the armies of the Allies were disheartened and thereby to induce the attacking forces to join the issue quickly.

The second part of the French plan lay in General Joffre’s decision not to do the expected thing.  With General Sarrail placed at the extremest point of danger, it would have been a likely move to transfer the entire British Expeditionary Force from the left wing to the weak point at Bar-le-Duc.  There is reason to believe that General von Kluck believed that this had been done.

The third part of the defensive prepared by General Joffre was that of a determination to turn the steady retreat into a counterdrive.  Time after time had the other generals implored their leader to give them leave to take the offensive, and on every occasion a shake of the head had been the reply.  Sir John French had wondered.  But when the French officers found themselves in the region of the Marne, close to the marshes of St. Gond, where in 1814 Napoleon had faced the Russians, they were more content.  It was familiar as well as historic ground.  Even the youngest officer knew every foot of that ground thoroughly.  It was, at the same time, the best point for the forward leap and one of the last points at which a halt could be made.