one district prohibiting the transfer of its stocks to any other, exactly as we had experienced with ourselves.

In particular, however, the agitation of the Entente agents (which had been frequently perceptible before), under the impression of the German military defeats, was most seriously felt.  The position of the Government which the Germans had set up at Kieff was unusually weak.  Moreover, the ever-active Bolshevik elements throughout the whole country were now working with increasing success against our organisation.  All this rendered the work more difficult in September and October—­and then came the collapse.

The difficulties of transport, too, were enormous; supplies had either to be sent to the Black Sea, across it and up the Danube, or straight through Galicia.  For this we often lacked sufficient wagons, and in the Ukraine also coal; there were, in addition, often instances of resistance on the part of the local railways, incited by the Bolsheviks, and much more of the same sort.

However great the lack of supplies in Ukraine itself, however much the limitations of our Russian means of payment may have contributed to the fact that the hopes entertained on the signing of peace at Brest-Litovsk were far from being realised, we may nevertheless maintain that all that was humanly possible was done to overcome the unprecedented difficulties encountered.  And in particular, by calling in the aid of the most capable and experienced firms of grain merchants, the forces available were utilised to the utmost degree.

Finally it should perhaps be pointed out that the import organisation—­apart from the before-mentioned interference of the military department and consequent fluctuations of the system—­was largely upset by very extensive smuggling operations, carried on more particularly from Galicia.  As such smuggling avoided the high export duty, the maximum prices appointed by the Ukrainian Government were constantly being overbid.  This smuggling was also in many cases assisted by elements from Vienna; altogether the nervousness prevailing in many leading circles in Vienna, and frequently criticising our own organisation in public, or upsetting arrangements before they could come into operation, did a great deal of damage.  It should also be mentioned that Germany likewise carried on a great deal of unofficially assisted smuggling, with ill effects on the official import organisation, and led to similar conditions on our own side.

Despite all obstacles, the machinery established, as will be seen from the following survey, nevertheless succeeded in getting not inconsiderable quantities of foodstuffs into the states concerned, amounting in all to about 42,000 wagons, though unfortunately the quantities delivered did not come up to the original expectations.

  SURVEY OF THE IMPORTS FROM UKRAINE DATING FROM COMMENCEMENT OF
  IMPORTATION (SPRING, 1918) TO NOVEMBER, 1918.