The solution of the question of nationality was the point round which all Franz Ferdinand’s political interests were centred during his lifetime.  Whether he would have succeeded is another question, but he certainly did try.  The Emperor Charles, too, was not averse to the movement.  The Emperor Francis Joseph was too old and too conservative to make the experiment.  His idea was quieta non movere.  Without powerful help from outside any attempt during the war against the German-Magyar opposition would not have been feasible.  Therefore, when Wilson came forward with his Fourteen Points, and in spite of the scepticism with which the message from Washington was received by the German public and here too, I at once resolved to take up the thread.

I repeat that I never doubted the honourable and sincere intentions entertained by Wilson—­nor do I doubt them now—­but my doubts as to his powers of carrying them out were from the first very pronounced.  It was obvious that Wilson, when conducting the war, was much stronger than when he took part in the Peace Conference.  As long as fighting proceeded Wilson was master of the world.  He had only to call back his troops from the European theatre of war and the Entente would be placed in a most difficult position.  It has always been incomprehensible to me why the President of the United States did not have recourse to this strong pressure during this time in order to preserve his own war aims.

The secret information that I received soon after the publication of the Fourteen Points led me to fear that Wilson, not understanding the situation, would fail to take any practical measures to secure respect for the regulations he had laid down, and that he underestimated France’s, and particularly Italy’s, opposition.  The logical and practical consequences of the Wilson programme would have been the public annulment of the Pact of London; it must have been so for us to understand the principles on which we could enter upon peace negotiations.  Nothing of that nature occurred, and the gap between Wilson’s and Orlando’s ideas of peace remained open.

On January 24, 1918, in the Committee of the Austrian Delegation, I spoke publicly on the subject of the Fourteen Points and declared them to be—­in so far as they applied to us and not to our Allies—­a suitable basis for negotiations.  Almost simultaneously we took steps to enlighten ourselves on the problem of how in a practical way the fourteen theoretical ideas of Wilson could be carried out.  The negotiations were then by no means hopeless.

Meanwhile the Brest negotiations were proceeding.  Although that episode, which represented a victory for German militarism, cannot have been very encouraging for Wilson, he was wise enough to recognise that we were in an awkward position and that the charge brought against Germany that she was making hidden annexations did not apply to Vienna.  On February 12—­thus, after the conclusion of the Brest peace—­the President, in his speech to Congress, said: