Napoleon added some threats, but in a less violent strain, and he confined himself to words, either because he had vented all his wrath in the first explosion, or because he merely designed to frighten the Germans who might be tempted to abandon him.  Such at least was the interpretation which those about him put upon his violence.  It was disapproved; no account was taken of it, and each was eager to accost the captive general, to tranquillize and to console him.  These attentions were continued till the army reached Lithuania, where the Cossacks retook Winzingerode and his aide-de-camp.  The Emperor had affected to treat this young Russian nobleman with kindness, at the same time that he stormed so loudly against his general—­a proof that there was calculation even in his wrath.

CHAP.  VII.

On the 28th of October we again beheld Mojaisk.  That town was still full of wounded; some were carried away and the rest collected together and left, as at Moscow, to the generosity of the Russians.  Napoleon had proceeded but a few wersts from that place, when the winter began.  Thus, after an obstinate combat, and ten days’ marching and countermarching, the army, which had brought from Moscow only fifteen rations of flour per man, had advanced but three days’ march in its retreat.  It was in want of provisions and overtaken by the winter.

Some men had already sunk under these hardships.  In the first days of the retreat, on the 26th of October, carriages, laden with provisions, which the horses could no longer draw, were burned.  The order for setting fire to all behind the army then followed; in obedience to it, powder-waggons, the horses of which were already worn out, were blown up together with the houses.  But at length, as the enemy had not again shown himself, we seemed to be but once more setting out on a toilsome journey; and Napoleon, on again seeing the well-known road, was recovering his confidence, when, towards evening, a Russian chasseur, who had been made prisoner, was sent to him by Davoust.

At first he questioned him carelessly; but as chance would have it, this Russian had some knowledge of roads, names, and distances.  He answered, that “the whole Russian army was marching by Medyn upon Wiazma.”  The Emperor then became attentive.  Did Kutusoff mean to forestall him there, as at Malo-Yaroslawetz, to cut off his retreat upon Smolensk, as he had done that upon Kalouga, and to coop him up in this desert without provisions, without shelter, and in the midst of a general insurrection?  His first impulse, however, inclined him to reject this notion; for, whether owing to pride or experience, he was accustomed not to give his adversaries credit for that ability which he should have displayed in their place.