History of the Expedition to Russia eBook

Philippe Paul, comte de Ségur
This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 679 pages of information about History of the Expedition to Russia.

History of the Expedition to Russia eBook

Philippe Paul, comte de Ségur
This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 679 pages of information about History of the Expedition to Russia.

A silence fraught with such imminent destinies continued to be respected, until Murat, whose actions were always the result of impetuous feeling, became weary of this hesitation.  Yielding to the dictates of his genius, which was wholly directed by his ardent temperament, he was eager to burst from that uncertainty, by one of those first movements which elevate to glory, or hurry to destruction.

Rising, he exclaimed, that “he might possibly be again accused of imprudence, but that in war circumstances decided and gave to every thing its name; that where there is no other course than to attack, prudence becomes temerity and temerity prudence; that to stop was impossible, to fly dangerous, consequently they ought to pursue.  What signified the menacing attitude of the Russians and their impenetrable woods?  For his part he cared not for them.  Give him but the remnant of his cavalry, and that of the guard, and he would force his way into their forests and their battalions, overthrow all before him, and open anew to the army the road to Kalouga.”

Here Napoleon, raising his head, extinguished all this fire, by saying, that “we had exhibited temerity enough already; that we had done too much for glory, and it was high time to give up thinking of any thing but how to save the rest of the army.”

Bessieres, either because his pride revolted from the idea of obeying the King of Naples, or from a desire to preserve uninjured the cavalry of the guard, which he had formed, for which he was answerable to Napoleon, and which he exclusively commanded; Bessieres, finding himself supported, then ventured to add, that “neither the army nor even the guard had sufficient spirit left for such efforts.  It was already said in both, that as the means of conveyance were inadequate, henceforth the victor, if overtaken, would fall a prey to the vanquished; that of course every wound would be mortal.  Murat would therefore be but feebly seconded.  And in what a position! its strength had just been but too well demonstrated.  Against what enemies! had they not remarked the field of the preceding day’s battle, and with what fury the Russian recruits, only just armed and clothed, had there fought and fell?” The Marshal concluded by voting in favour of retreat, which the Emperor approved by his silence.

The Prince of Eckmuehl immediately observed, that, “as a retreat was decided upon, he proposed that it should be by Medyn and Smolensk.”  But Murat interrupted Davoust, and whether from enmity or from that discouragement which usually succeeds the rejection of a rash measure, he declared his astonishment, “that any one should dare to propose so imprudent a step to the Emperor.  Had Davoust sworn the destruction of the army?  Would he have so long and so heavy a column trail along, without guides and in uncertainty, on an unknown track, within reach of Kutusoff, presenting its flank to all the attacks of the enemy?  Would he, Davoust, defend it?  Why—­when in our rear Borowsk and Vereia would lead us without danger to Mojaisk—­why reject that safe route?  There, provisions must have been collected, there every thing was known to us, and we could not be misled by any traitor.”

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History of the Expedition to Russia from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.