History of the Expedition to Russia eBook

Philippe Paul, comte de Ségur
This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 679 pages of information about History of the Expedition to Russia.

History of the Expedition to Russia eBook

Philippe Paul, comte de Ségur
This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 679 pages of information about History of the Expedition to Russia.

But their left wing did not end there.  The emperor knew that behind this wood was the old Moscow road; that it turned round the left wing of the Russians, and passing behind their army, ran again into the new Moscow road in front of Mojaisk.  He judged that it must be occupied; and, in fact, Tutchkof, with his corps d’armee, had placed himself across it at the entrance of a wood; he had covered himself by two heights, on which he had planted artillery.

But this was of little consequence, because, between this detached corps and the last Russian redoubt, there was a space of five or six hundred fathoms and a covered ground.  If we did not begin with overwhelming Tutchkof, we might therefore occupy it, pass between him and the last of Bagration’s redoubts, and take the left wing of the enemy in flank; but the emperor could not satisfy himself on this point, as the Russian advanced posts and the woods forbade his farther advance, and intercepted his view.

Having finished his reconnoissance, he formed his plan.  “Eugene shall be the pivot!” he exclaimed:  “it is the right that must commence.  As soon as, under cover of the wood, it has taken the redoubt opposite to it, it must make a movement to the left, and march on the Russian flank, sweeping and driving back their whole army upon their right and into the Kologha.”

The general plan thus conceived, he applied himself to the details.  During the night, three batteries, of sixty guns each, must be opposed to the Russian redoubts; two facing their left, the third before their centre.  At daybreak, Poniatowski and his army, reduced to five thousand men, must advance on the old Smolensk road, turning the wood on which the French right wing and the Russian left were supported.  He would flank the one and annoy the other; the army would wait for the report of his first shots.

Instantly, the whole of the artillery should commence upon the left of the Russians, its fire would open their ranks and redoubts, and Davoust and Ney should rush upon them; they should be supported by Junot and his Westphalians, by Murat and his cavalry, and lastly, by the emperor himself, with 20,000 guards.  It was against these two redoubts that the first efforts should be made; it was by them that he would penetrate into the hostile army, thenceforth mutilated, and whose centre and right would then be uncovered, and almost enveloped.

Meanwhile, as the Russians showed themselves in redoubled masses on their centre and their right, threatening the Moscow road, the only line of operation of the grand army; as in throwing his chief force and himself on their left, Napoleon was about to place the Kologha between him and that road, his only retreat, he resolved to strengthen the army of Italy which occupied it, and joined with it two of Davoust’s divisions and Grouchy’s cavalry.  As to his left, he judged that one Italian division, the Bavarian cavalry, and that of Ornano, about 10,000 men, would suffice to cover it.  Such were the plans of Napoleon.

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History of the Expedition to Russia from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.