In the two sides were placed four biscuits of sixteen ounces each; under these, and at the bottom, was a long, narrow, linen bag, filled with ten pounds of flour.  The whole knapsack and its contents, together with the straps and the hood, rolled up and fastened at top, weighed thirty-three pounds twelve ounces.

Each soldier carried also a linen bag, slung in form of a shoulder-belt, containing two loaves of three pounds each.  Thus with his sabre, his loaded knapsack, three flints, his turn-screw, his belt and musket, he had to carry fifty-eight pounds weight, and was provided with bread for four days, biscuit for four, flour for seven, and sixty rounds of ammunition.

Behind it were carriages laden with provisions for six more days; but it was impossible to reckon with confidence on these vehicles, picked up on the spot, which would have been so convenient in any other country with a smaller army, and in a more regular war.

When the flour-bag was emptied, it was filled with any corn that could be found, and which was ground at the first mill, if any chanced to be met with; if not, by the hand-mills which followed the regiments, or which were found in the villages, for the Russians are scarcely acquainted with any others.  It took sixteen men twelve hours to grind in one of them the corn necessary for one hundred and thirty men for one day.

As every house in this country has an oven, little want was felt on that score; bakers abounded; for the regiments of the first corps contained men of all trades, so that articles of food and clothing were all made or repaired by them during the march.  They were colonies uniting the character of civilized and nomadic.  The emperor had first conceived the idea, which the genius of the prince of Eckmuehl had appropriated; he had every thing he wanted, time, place, and men to carry it into execution; but these three elements of success were less at the disposal of the other chiefs.  Besides, their characters being more impetuous and less methodical, would scarcely have derived the same advantages from it; with a less organizing genius, they would therefore have had more obstacles to surmount; the emperor had not paid sufficient attention to these differences, which were productive of baneful effects.

CHAP.  II.

It was from Slawkowo, a few leagues beyond Dorogobouje, that Napoleon sent orders, on the 27th of August, to marshal Victor, who was then on the Niemen, to advance to Smolensk.  This marshal’s left was to occupy Witepsk, his right Mohilef, and his centre Smolensk.  There he would succour Saint-Cyr, in case of need, serve for a point of support to the army of Moscow, and keep up his communications with Lithuania.

It was also from the same imperial head-quarters that he published the details of his review at Valoutina, with the intention of proclaiming to the present and future ages the names even of the private soldiers who had there distinguished themselves.  But he added, that at Smolensk “the conduct of the Poles had astonished the Russians, who had been accustomed to despise them.”  These words drew from the Poles an outcry of indignation, and the emperor smiled at an anger which he had foreseen, and the effects of which were designed to fall exclusively on the Russians.