Most of the younger Subalterns had very primitive ideas on the general strategy of the campaign.  There would be a wait, they thought, as the English Army would probably be used as general reserve; then there would be “the devil of a battle,” ending in Victory or Defeat, and followed by a glorious life (or death), and that would be the end of the matter.  It would be over by Christmas, “easy.”  The actual course of events was very different.  The English had encountered the enemy in the first onslaught of battle, and there had been neither Victory nor Defeat—­nothing but retreat, retreat, retreat, over twenty miles a day, in the blazing heat of sunny France, with the fear of capture for those who lagged behind....

The fighting was not like those battles on Laffans Plain, where you fought quickly and decisively, and where, “win, draw, or lose,” you were home in time for tea.  You were told all about it beforehand by the Colonel, or Brigadier, and sometimes the “show” approached interest.  Here everything was different.  This was the real thing.  Yet there seemed less reality in it than in the mock battles of Aldershot, with their mock situations, tired charges and rattling bolts.  Here you knew nothing, you were barely told where to move.  There were none of those charming little papers headed:  “General Idea, White Army moving on, etc....” and:  “Special Idea, the nth Infantry Brigade, commanded by, etc. etc....”  The “General Idea” of this campaign remained absolute darkness; and already pessimists began to fear that Christmas would not see them back at home.

As far as eagerness to meet the enemy was concerned the “morale” was as high as ever, but nevertheless the temper of the troops was beginning to be badly shaken.  They did not understand the necessity for retreat; for not a word had been whispered of other set-backs.  They had a ridiculous, but nevertheless firmly lodged, impression that this prolonged retreat was just another of those needless “fatigues” to which they were so often put, and vaguely they resented it, distrusted the necessity for it.  Mr. Thomas Atkins found it difficult to believe in the existence of Germans whom he could not see.  In a word, he was beginning to be “fed up”; especially the reservists, oldish men who had been called from their homes, bundled once more into uniforms, hurried to a foreign land of which they knew nothing, and pushed into a battle which showed great promise of becoming a “debacle.”

But you must not blame the men for this.  You must remember that they had left England before the spirit of patriotism had been re-kindled.  They felt, and before reams of paper had been scattered broadcast to prove the contrary the feeling was very prevalent, that great diplomatic blunders must have been made for the situation to have reached such an impasse.  Germany had been out for war before:  witness Agadir and similar disturbances in the diplomatic world which occurred with almost monotonous regularity every August.  Previously war had simply been denied to Germany.  Why not once again?  And so on, and so forth.  Probably they did not really believe or mean half they said.  They were thirsty, hungry, and very, very tired.