Palan points out that even after it was fully recognised that the retention of Cuba was impossible, the worst catastrophes might have been avoided.  “In place of treating for peace while the squadron was intact at Santiago, which, as well as Manila, could have been defended for some time, the Ministers waited to sue for peace until everything was lost, while it was perfectly well known beforehand that that result was inevitable.”  During the whole time, manana veremos was the rule of action—­a to-morrow that never was to dawn for those whose lives it was intended to sacrifice.  Heaven works no miracles for those who fling themselves against the impossible!

So long ago as 1823, Thomas Jefferson wrote to President Monroe:  “The addition of the island of Cuba to our Confederacy is exactly what is wanted to round our power as a nation to the point of its utmost interest.”  John Quincy Adams went so far as to state that “Cuba gravitates to the United States as the apple yet hanging on its native trunk gravitates to the earth which sustains it”—­a statement which has the more force when it is remembered that for over fifty years the Cuban insurgents had been liberally supplied with arms, ammunition, stores, and troops from the United States whenever they required them!  And this, not because Cuba was mismanaged by Spain, but because America coveted her as “the most interesting addition that could be made to our system of States,” to quote Jefferson once more.

Nevertheless, the heroic sons of Spain were offered up as an expiation for the sins of her political jugglers for generations past.  With the knowledge that America had at least for seventy years been seeking an excuse for “rounding her power as a nation” by the seizure of Cuba, no real effort was made to redress the grievances of her native population, nor to efficiently defend her coasts.

The state of affairs in Manila was still worse.  The culpable neglect of the Government had resulted in the so-called squadron not being possessed of one single ship of modern construction or armament; and when the unfortunate marines and their heroic commanders had been immolated by the overwhelming superiority in numbers and efficiency of the Americans, the noisy injustice and anger of a senseless crowd at home were allowed to compass the lasting disgrace of casting the blame for the foreseen disasters on Admiral Montojo, who was thrown as a victim to the jackals.

To-day, we find Spain absolutely without a navy.  Two second- or third-class ships—­and they not even properly found or armed—­are all she possesses.  Men she has, however, with the traditions of a great past, while the officers of her navy are thoroughly alive to the class of ships and the armament which are needed to give their country the protection, and their foreign policy the dignity, which other countries of far less importance are able to sustain.  No wonder that her writers are pointing