I have now touched on what seem to me the salient points in both of the volumes by these two famous statesmen.  I have, I hope, brought out sufficiently the fact that on their own showing they were pursuing contradictory policies, and that it was the consequent failure to follow a policy that was consistent and continuous that in the end led Germany to the slippery slope down which she glided into war.  The circumstances of the world before and in 1914 were so difficult, the piling up of armaments had been so great, that nothing but the utmost caution could secure a safe path.  I believe the Emperor and Bethmann to have desired wholeheartedly the preservation of the peace.  But to that end they took inadequate means, and the result was a disastrous failure to accomplish it.

The disturbing presence of the policy of relying on a preponderance in power over England, to be gained by a great navy, to the side of which the smaller navies would be attracted, imposed on England the necessity of guarding against what was menacing the national life.  As the outcome of this situation she was compelled, so long as Germany insisted on developing her naval policy, to sit down and take thought.  The result of her deliberations may be summed up in eight propositions: 

  1.  It was necessary, if the safety of England by sea was not to be
  put in jeopardy that she should enter into real and close
  friendships with other nations.

  2.  The great attraction to these other nations would lie in the
  maintenance of British sea power.

3.  While the power of the British Navy was of the first importance to France, she might also, through no fault of her own, be placed in such peril as made it desirable that we should be able to render her help by land also.

4.  But the military forces of France and her ally, Russia, were great enough to make it reasonable to estimate that a small army from England would be a sufficient addition to enable France to break the shock of an aggressive attack on her.

5.  Even on purely military grounds it was impossible for Great Britain to raise in time of peace a great army for use on the Continent.  The necessity of recruiting and educating the necessary corps of professional officers required to train and command such an army would have occupied at least two generations if the task were to be taken in hand in peace time.  But it was possible to organize and prepare a small but highly trained Expeditionary Force, provided we discarded some of our old military traditions, and studied modern requirements and objectives in consultation with those who were best able to throw light on them.

6.  Altho more than modern and scientific military organization on a comparatively small scale was not in our power, we could in carrying out even this much lay foundations which would enable expansion in time of war to take place.