Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 1,748 pages of information about Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae).

Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 1,748 pages of information about Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae).

I answer that, This question depends on the preceding.  For if grace is the same as virtue, it must necessarily be in the powers of the soul as in a subject; since the soul’s powers are the proper subject of virtue, as stated above (Q. 56, A. 1).  But if grace differs from virtue, it cannot be said that a power of the soul is the subject of grace, since every perfection of the soul’s powers has the nature of virtue, as stated above (Q. 55, A. 1; Q. 56, A. 1).  Hence it remains that grace, as it is prior to virtue, has a subject prior to the powers of the soul, so that it is in the essence of the soul.  For as man in his intellective powers participates in the Divine knowledge through the virtue of faith, and in his power of will participates in the Divine love through the virtue of charity, so also in the nature of the soul does he participate in the Divine Nature, after the manner of a likeness, through a certain regeneration or re-creation.

Reply Obj. 1:  As from the essence of the soul flows its powers, which are the principles of deeds, so likewise the virtues, whereby the powers are moved to act, flow into the powers of the soul from grace.  And thus grace is compared to the will as the mover to the moved, which is the same comparison as that of a horseman to the horse—­but not as an accident to a subject.

And thereby is made clear the Reply to the Second Objection.  For grace is the principle of meritorious works through the medium of virtues, as the essence of the soul is the principal of vital deeds through the medium of the powers.

Reply Obj. 3:  The soul is the subject of grace, as being in the species of intellectual or rational nature.  But the soul is not classed in a species by any of its powers, since the powers are natural properties of the soul following upon the species.  Hence the soul differs specifically in its essence from other souls, viz. of dumb animals, and of plants.  Consequently it does not follow that, if the essence of the human soul is the subject of grace, every soul may be the subject of grace; since it belongs to the essence of the soul, inasmuch as it is of such a species.

Reply Obj. 4:  Since the powers of the soul are natural properties following upon the species, the soul cannot be without them.  Yet, granted that it was without them, the soul would still be called intellectual or rational in its species, not that it would actually have these powers, but on account of the essence of such a species, from which these powers naturally flow. ________________________

QUESTION 111

OF THE DIVISION OF GRACE
(In Five Articles)

We must now consider the division of grace; under which head there are five points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether grace is fittingly divided into gratuitous grace and sanctifying grace?

(2) Of the division into operating and cooperating grace;

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.