Nevertheless those ordinances also which refer to punishments and rewards may be called “testimonies,” in so far as they testify to the Divine justice.  Again all the precepts of the Law may be styled “justifications,” as being executions of legal justice.  Furthermore the commandments may be distinguished from the precepts, so that those things be called “precepts” which God Himself prescribed; and those things “commandments” which He enjoined (mandavit) through others, as the very word seems to denote.

From this it is clear that all the precepts of the Law are either moral, ceremonial, or judicial; and that other ordinances have not the character of a precept, but are directed to the observance of the precepts, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 1:  Justice alone, of all the virtues, implies the notion of duty.  Consequently moral matters are determinable by law in so far as they belong to justice:  of which virtue religion is a part, as Tully says (De Invent. ii).  Wherefore the legal just cannot be anything foreign to the ceremonial and judicial precepts.

The Replies to the other Objections are clear from what has been said.
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SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 99, Art. 6]

Whether the Old Law Should Have Induced Men to the Observance of Its
Precepts, by Means of Temporal Promises and Threats?

Objection 1:  It would seem that the Old Law should not have induced men to the observance of its precepts, by means of temporal promises and threats.  For the purpose of the Divine law is to subject man to God by fear and love:  hence it is written (Deut. 10:12):  “And now, Israel, what doth the Lord thy God require of thee, but that thou fear the Lord thy God, and walk in His ways, and love Him?” But the desire for temporal goods leads man away from God:  for Augustine says (Qq. lxxxiii, qu. 36), that “covetousness is the bane of charity.”  Therefore temporal promises and threats seem to be contrary to the intention of a lawgiver:  and this makes a law worthy of rejection, as the Philosopher declares (Polit. ii, 6).

Obj. 2:  Further, the Divine law is more excellent than human law.  Now, in sciences, we notice that the loftier the science, the higher the means of persuasion that it employs.  Therefore, since human law employs temporal threats and promises, as means of persuading man, the Divine law should have used, not these, but more lofty means.

Obj. 3:  Further, the reward of righteousness and the punishment of guilt cannot be that which befalls equally the good and the wicked.  But as stated in Eccles. 9:2, “all” temporal “things equally happen to the just and to the wicked, to the good and the evil, to the clean and to the unclean, to him that offereth victims, and to him that despiseth sacrifices.”  Therefore temporal goods or evils are not suitably set forth as punishments or rewards of the commandments of the Divine law.

On the contrary, It is written (Isa. 1:19, 20):  “If you be willing, and will hearken to Me, you shall eat the good things of the land.  But if you will not, and will provoke Me to wrath:  the sword shall devour you.”