Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 1,748 pages of information about Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae).

Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 1,748 pages of information about Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae).

Further, it is likewise written (Jam. 4:7):  “Be subject . . . to God, but resist the devil, and he will fly from you,” which would be said neither rightly nor truly, if the devil were able to compel us, in any way whatever, to sin; for then neither would it be possible to resist him, nor would he fly from those who do.  Therefore he does not compel to sin.

I answer that, The devil, by his own power, unless he be restrained by God, can compel anyone to do an act which, in its genus, is a sin; but he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning.  This is evident from the fact that man does not resist that which moves him to sin, except by his reason; the use of which the devil is able to impede altogether, by moving the imagination and the sensitive appetite; as is the case with one who is possessed.  But then, the reason being thus fettered, whatever man may do, it is not imputed to him as a sin.  If, however, the reason is not altogether fettered, then, in so far as it is free, it can resist sin, as stated above (Q. 77, A. 7).  It is consequently evident that the devil can nowise compel man to sin.

Reply Obj. 1:  Not every power that is greater than man, can move man’s will; God alone can do this, as stated above (Q. 9, A. 6).

Reply Obj. 2:  That which is apprehended by the senses or the imagination does not move the will, of necessity, so long as man has the use of reason; nor does such an apprehension always fetter the reason.

Reply Obj. 3:  The lusting of the flesh against the spirit, when the reason actually resists it, is not a sin, but is matter for the exercise of virtue.  That reason does not resist, is not in the devil’s power; wherefore he cannot bring about the necessity of sinning. ________________________

FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 80, Art. 4]

Whether All the Sins of Men Are Due to the Devil’s Suggestion?

Objection 1:  It would seem that all the sins of men are due to the devil’s suggestion.  For Dionysius says (Div.  Nom. iv) that the “crowd of demons are the cause of all evils, both to themselves and to others.”

Obj. 2:  Further, whoever sins mortally, becomes the slave of the devil, according to John 8:34:  “Whosoever committeth sin is the slave [Douay:  ‘servant’] of sin.”  Now “by whom a man is overcome, of the same also he is the slave” (2 Pet. 2:19).  Therefore whoever commits a sin, has been overcome by the devil.

Obj. 3:  Further, Gregory says (Moral. iv, 10) the sin of the devil is irreparable, because he sinned at no other’s suggestion.  Therefore, if any men were to sin of their own free-will and without suggestion from any other, their sin would be irremediable:  which is clearly false.  Therefore all the sins of men are due to the devil’s suggestion.

On the contrary, It is written (De Eccl.  Dogm. lxxxii):  “Not all our evil thoughts are incited by the devil; sometimes they are due to a movement of the free-will.”

Copyrights
Project Gutenberg
Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.