Obj. 2:  Further, the passions are acts or movements of the sensitive appetite.  Now it needs a greater difference to differentiate habits than acts.  Hence diverse objects which do not diversify the species of passions, do not diversify the species of moral virtue:  so that there is but one moral virtue about all objects of pleasure, and the same applies to the other passions.

Obj. 3:  Further, more or less do not change a species.  Now various objects of pleasure differ only by reason of being more or less pleasurable.  Therefore all objects of pleasure belong to one species of virtue:  and for the same reason so do all fearful objects, and the same applies to others.  Therefore moral virtue is not diversified according to the objects of the passions.

Obj. 4:  Further, virtue hinders evil, even as it produces good.  But there are various virtues about the desires for good things:  thus temperance is about desires for the pleasure of touch, and eutrapelia about pleasures in games.  Therefore there should be different virtues about fears of evils.

On the contrary, Chastity is about sexual pleasures, abstinence about pleasures of the table, and eutrapelia about pleasures in games.

I answer that, The perfection of a virtue depends on the reason; whereas the perfection of a passion depends on the sensitive appetite.  Consequently virtues must needs be differentiated according to their relation to reason, but the passions according to their relation to the appetite.  Hence the objects of the passions, according as they are variously related to the sensitive appetite, cause the different species of passions:  while, according as they are related to reason, they cause the different species of virtues.  Now the movement of reason is not the same as that of the sensitive appetite.  Wherefore nothing hinders a difference of objects from causing diversity of passions, without causing diversity of virtues, as when one virtue is about several passions, as stated above (A. 4); and again, a difference of objects from causing different virtues, without causing a difference of passions, since several virtues are directed about one passion, e.g. pleasure.

And because diverse passions belonging to diverse powers, always belong to diverse virtues, as stated above (A. 4); therefore a difference of objects that corresponds to a difference of powers always causes a specific difference of virtues—­for instance the difference between that which is good absolutely speaking, and that which is good and difficult to obtain.  Moreover since the reason rules man’s lower powers in a certain order, and even extends to outward things; hence, one single object of the passions, according as it is apprehended by sense, imagination, or reason, and again, according as it belongs to the soul, body, or external things, has various relations to reason, and consequently is of a nature to cause