Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 1,748 pages of information about Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae).

Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) eBook

This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 1,748 pages of information about Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae).

OF THE INCREASE OF HABITS
(In Three Articles)

We have now to consider the increase of habits; under which head there are three points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether habits increase?

(2) Whether they increase by addition?

(3) Whether each act increases the habit?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 52, Art. 1]

Whether Habits Increase?

Objection 1:  It would seem that habits cannot increase.  For increase concerns quantity (Phys. v, text. 18).  But habits are not in the genus [of] quantity, but in that of quality.  Therefore there can be no increase of habits.

Obj. 2:  Further, habit is a perfection (Phys. vii, text. 17, 18).  But since perfection conveys a notion of end and term, it seems that it cannot be more or less.  Therefore a habit cannot increase.

Obj. 3:  Further, those things which can be more or less are subject to alteration:  for that which from being less hot becomes more hot, is said to be altered.  But in habits there is no alteration, as is proved in Phys. vii, text. 15, 17.  Therefore habits cannot increase.

On the contrary, Faith is a habit, and yet it increases:  wherefore the disciples said to our Lord (Luke 17:5):  “Lord, increase our faith.”  Therefore habits increase.

I answer that, Increase, like other things pertaining to quantity, is transferred from bodily quantities to intelligible spiritual things, on account of the natural connection of the intellect with corporeal things, which come under the imagination.  Now in corporeal quantities, a thing is said to be great, according as it reaches the perfection of quantity due to it; wherefore a certain quantity is reputed great in man, which is not reputed great in an elephant.  And so also in forms, we say a thing is great because it is perfect.  And since good has the nature of perfection, therefore “in things which are great, but not in quantity, to be greater is the same as to be better,” as Augustine says (De Trin. vi, 8).

Now the perfection of a form may be considered in two ways:  first, in respect of the form itself:  secondly, in respect of the participation of the form by its subject.  In so far as we consider the perfections of a form in respect of the form itself, thus the form is said to be “little” or “great”:  for instance great or little health or science.  But in so far as we consider the perfection of a form in respect of the participation thereof by the subject, it is said to be “more” or “less”:  for instance more or less white or healthy.  Now this distinction is not to be understood as implying that the form has a being outside its matter or subject, but that it is one thing to consider the form according to its specific nature, and another to consider it in respect of its participation by a subject.

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Summa Theologica, Part I-II (Pars Prima Secundae) from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.