Reply Obj. 1:  We speak of anger in God, not as of a passion of the soul but as of judgment of justice, inasmuch as He wills to take vengeance on sin.  Because the sinner, by sinning, cannot do God any actual harm:  but so far as he himself is concerned, he acts against God in two ways.  First, in so far as he despises God in His commandments.  Secondly, in so far as he harms himself or another; which injury redounds to God, inasmuch as the person injured is an object of God’s providence and protection.

Reply Obj. 2:  If we are angry with those who harm others, and seek to be avenged on them, it is because those who are injured belong in some way to us:  either by some kinship or friendship, or at least because of the nature we have in common.

Reply Obj. 3:  When we take a very great interest in a thing, we look upon it as our own good; so that if anyone despise it, it seems as though we ourselves were despised and injured.

Reply Obj. 4:  Silence provokes the insulter to anger when he thinks it is due to contempt, as though his anger were slighted:  and a slight is an action. ________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 47, Art. 2]

Whether the Sole Motive of Anger Is Slight or Contempt?

Objection 1:  It would seem that slight or contempt is not the sole motive of anger.  For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 16) that we are angry “when we suffer, or think that we are suffering, an injury.”  But one may suffer an injury without being despised or slighted.  Therefore a slight is not the only motive of anger.

Obj. 2:  Further, desire for honor and grief for a slight belong to the same subject.  But dumb animals do not desire honor.  Therefore they are not grieved by being slighted.  And yet “they are roused to anger, when wounded,” as the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 8).  Therefore a slight is not the sole motive of anger.

Obj. 3:  Further, the Philosopher (Rhet. ii, 2) gives many other causes of anger, for instance, “being forgotten by others; that others should rejoice in our misfortunes; that they should make known our evils; being hindered from doing as we like.”  Therefore being slighted is not the only motive for being angry.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 2) that anger is “a desire, with sorrow, for vengeance, on account of a seeming slight done unbecomingly.”

I answer that, All the causes of anger are reduced to slight.  For slight is of three kinds, as stated in Rhet. ii, 2, viz. “contempt,”
  “despiteful treatment,” i.e. hindering one from doing one’s will,
and “insolence”:  and all motives of anger are reduced to these three.  Two reasons may be assigned for this.  First, because anger seeks another’s hurt as being a means of just vengeance:  wherefore it seeks vengeance in so far as it seems just.  Now just vengeance is taken only for that which is done unjustly; hence that which