Reply Obj. 2:  Those who are quick-tempered do not hide their anger; wherefore the harm they do others is not so sudden, as not to be foreseen.  On the other hand, those who are gentle or cunning hide their anger; wherefore the harm which may be impending from them, cannot be foreseen, but takes one by surprise.  For this reason the Philosopher says that such men are feared more than others.

Reply Obj. 3:  Bodily good or evil, considered in itself, seems greater at first.  The reason for this is that a thing is more obvious when seen in juxtaposition with its contrary.  Hence, when a man passes unexpectedly from penury to wealth, he thinks more of his wealth on account of his previous poverty:  while, on the other hand, the rich man who suddenly becomes poor, finds poverty all the more disagreeable.  For this reason sudden evil is feared more, because it seems more to be evil.  However, it may happen through some accident that the greatness of some evil is hidden; for instance if the foe hides himself in ambush:  and then it is true that evil inspires greater fear through being much thought about. ________________________

SIXTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 6]

Whether Those Things Are More Feared, for Which There Is No Remedy?

Objection 1:  It would seem that those things are not more to be feared, for which there is no remedy.  Because it is a condition of fear, that there be some hope of safety, as stated above (A. 2).  But an evil that cannot be remedied leaves no hope of escape.  Therefore such things are not feared at all.

Obj. 2:  Further, there is no remedy for the evil of death:  since, in the natural course of things, there is no return from death to life.  And yet death is not the most feared of all things, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5).  Therefore those things are not feared most, for which there is no remedy.

Obj. 3:  Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. i, 6) that “a thing which lasts long is no better than that which lasts but one day:  nor is that which lasts for ever any better than that which is not everlasting”:  and the same applies to evil.  But things that cannot be remedied seem to differ from other things, merely in the point of their lasting long or for ever.  Consequently they are not therefore any worse or more to be feared.

On the contrary, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that “those things are most to be feared which when done wrong cannot be put right . . . or for which there is no help, or which are not easy.”

I answer that, The object of fear is evil:  consequently whatever tends to increase evil, conduces to the increase of fear.  Now evil is increased not only in its species of evil, but also in respect of circumstances, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 3).  And of all the circumstances, longlastingness, or even everlastingness, seems to have the greatest bearing on the increase of evil.  Because things that