Reply Obj. 1:  Augustine puts desire or covetousness in place of hope, in so far as they seem to regard the same object, viz. some future good.

Reply Obj. 2:  These are called principal passions, in the order of intention and completion.  And though fear and hope are not the last passions simply, yet they are the last of those passions that tend towards something as future.  Nor can the argument be pressed any further except in the case of anger:  yet neither can anger be reckoned a principal passion, because it is an effect of daring, which cannot be a principal passion, as we shall state further on (Reply Obj. 3).

Reply Obj. 3:  Despair implies movement away from good; and this is, as it were, accidental:  and daring implies movement towards evil; and this too is accidental.  Consequently these cannot be principal passions; because that which is accidental cannot be said to be principal.  And so neither can anger be called a principal passion, because it arises from daring. ________________________

QUESTION 26

OF THE PASSIONS OF THE SOUL IN PARTICULAR:  AND FIRST, OF LOVE (In Four Articles)

We have now to consider the soul’s passions in particular, and (1) the passions of the concupiscible faculty; (2) the passions of the irascible faculty.

The first of these considerations will be threefold:  since we shall consider (1) Love and hatred; (2) Desire and aversion; (3) Pleasure and sadness.

Concerning love, three points must be considered:  (1) Love itself; (2) The cause of love; (3) The effects of love.  Under the first head there are four points of inquiry: 

(1) Whether love is in the concupiscible power?

(2) Whether love is a passion?

(3) Whether love is the same as dilection?

(4) Whether love is properly divided into love of friendship, and love of concupiscence? ________________________

FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 26, Art. 1]

Whether Love Is in the Concupiscible Power?

Objection 1:  It would seem that love is not in the concupiscible power.  For it is written (Wis. 8:2):  “Her,” namely wisdom, “have I loved, and have sought her out from my youth.”  But the concupiscible power, being a part of the sensitive appetite, cannot tend to wisdom, which is not apprehended by the senses.  Therefore love is not in the concupiscible power.

Obj. 2:  Further, love seems to be identified with every passion:  for Augustine says (De Civ.  Dei xiv, 7):  “Love, yearning for the object beloved, is desire; having and enjoying it, is joy; fleeing what is contrary to it, is fear; and feeling what is contrary to it, is sadness.”  But not every passion is in the concupiscible power; indeed, fear, which is mentioned in this passage, is in the irascible power.  Therefore we must not say absolutely that love is in the concupiscible power.