I answer that, We may consider the passions of the soul in two ways:  first, in themselves; secondly, as being subject to the command of the reason and will.  If then the passions be considered in themselves, to wit, as movements of the irrational appetite, thus there is no moral good or evil in them, since this depends on the reason, as stated above (Q. 18, A. 5).  If, however, they be considered as subject to the command of the reason and will, then moral good and evil are in them.  Because the sensitive appetite is nearer than the outward members to the reason and will; and yet the movements and actions of the outward members are morally good or evil, inasmuch as they are voluntary.  Much more, therefore, may the passions, in so far as they are voluntary, be called morally good or evil.  And they are said to be voluntary, either from being commanded by the will, or from not being checked by the will.

Reply Obj. 1:  These passions, considered in themselves, are common to man and other animals:  but, as commanded by the reason, they are proper to man.

Reply Obj. 2:  Even the lower appetitive powers are called rational, in so far as “they partake of reason in some sort” (Ethic. i, 13).

Reply Obj. 3:  The Philosopher says that we are neither praised nor blamed for our passions considered absolutely; but he does not exclude their becoming worthy of praise or blame, in so far as they are subordinate to reason.  Hence he continues:  “For the man who fears or is angry, is not praised . . . or blamed, but the man who is angry in a certain way, i.e. according to, or against reason.” ________________________

SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 24, Art. 2]

Whether Every Passion of the Soul Is Evil Morally?

Objection 1:  It would seem that all the passions of the soul are morally evil.  For Augustine says (De Civ.  Dei ix, 4) that “some call the soul’s passions diseases or disturbances of the soul” [Cf.  Q. 22, A. 2, footnote].  But every disease or disturbance of the soul is morally evil.  Therefore every passion of the soul is evil morally.

Obj. 2:  Further, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that “movement in accord with nature is an action, but movement contrary to nature is passion.”  But in movements of the soul, what is against nature is sinful and morally evil:  hence he says elsewhere (De Fide Orth. ii, 4) that “the devil turned from that which is in accord with nature to that which is against nature.”  Therefore these passions are morally evil.

Obj. 3:  Further, whatever leads to sin, has an aspect of evil.  But these passions lead to sin:  wherefore they are called “the passions of sins” (Rom. 7:5).  Therefore it seems that they are morally evil.

On the contrary, Augustine says (De Civ.  Dei xiv, 9) that “all these emotions are right in those whose love is rightly placed . . .  For they fear to sin, they desire to persevere; they grieve for sin, they rejoice in good works.”