Reply Obj. 1:  In irrational animals the determination of the appetite to a particular thing is merely passive:  whereas consent implies a determination of the appetite, which is active rather than merely passive.

Reply Obj. 2:  If the first be removed, then what follows is removed, provided that, properly speaking, it follow from that only.  But if something can follow from several things, it is not removed by the fact that one of them is removed; thus if hardening is the effect of heat and of cold (since bricks are hardened by the fire, and frozen water is hardened by the cold), then by removing heat it does not follow that there is no hardening.  Now the accomplishment of an act follows not only from consent, but also from the impulse of the appetite, such as is found in irrational animals.

Reply Obj. 3:  The man who acts through passion is able not to follow the passion:  whereas irrational animals have not that power.  Hence the comparison fails. ________________________

THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 15, Art. 3]

Whether Consent Is Directed to the End or to the Means?

Objection 1:  It would seem that consent is directed to the end. 
Because that on account of which a thing is such is still more such. 
But it is on account of the end that we consent to the means. 
Therefore, still more do we consent to the end.

Obj. 2:  Further, the act of the intemperate man is his end, just as the act of the virtuous man is his end.  But the intemperate man consents to his own act.  Therefore consent can be directed to the end.

Obj. 3:  Further, desire of the means is choice, as stated above (Q. 13, A. 1).  If therefore consent were only directed to the means it would nowise differ from choice.  And this is proved to be false by the authority of Damascene who says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that “after the approval” which he calls “the sentence,” “comes the choice.”  Therefore consent is not only directed to the means.

On the contrary, Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that the “sentence,” i.e. the consent, takes place “when a man approves and embraces the judgment of his counsel.”  But counsel is only about the means.  Therefore the same applies to consent.

I answer that, Consent is the application of the appetitive movement to something that is already in the power of him who causes the application.  Now the order of action is this:  First there is the apprehension of the end; then the desire of the end; then the counsel about the means; then the desire of the means.  Now the appetite tends to the last end naturally:  wherefore the application of the appetitive movement to the apprehended end has not the nature of consent, but of simple volition.  But as to those things which come under consideration after the last end, in so far as they are directed to the end, they come under counsel:  and so counsel can be applied to them, in so far as the appetitive