(6) Whether the process of counsel is indefinite?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 14, Art. 1]

Whether Counsel Is an Inquiry?

Objection 1:  It would seem that counsel is not an inquiry.  For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel is “an act of the appetite.”  But inquiry is not an act of the appetite.  Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.

Obj. 2:  Further, inquiry is a discursive act of the intellect:  for which reason it is not found in God, Whose knowledge is not discursive, as we have shown in the First Part (Q. 14, A. 7).  But counsel is ascribed to God:  for it is written (Eph. 1:11) that “He worketh all things according to the counsel of His will.”  Therefore counsel is not inquiry.

Obj. 3:  Further, inquiry is of doubtful matters.  But counsel is given in matters that are certainly good; thus the Apostle says (1 Cor. 7:25):  “Now concerning virgins I have no commandment of the Lord:  but I give counsel.”  Therefore counsel is not an inquiry.

On the contrary, Gregory of Nyssa [Nemesius, De Nat.  Hom. xxxiv.] says:  “Every counsel is an inquiry; but not every inquiry is a counsel.”

I answer that, Choice, as stated above (Q. 13, A. 1, ad 2; A. 3), follows the judgment of the reason about what is to be done.  Now there is much uncertainty in things that have to be done; because actions are concerned with contingent singulars, which by reason of their vicissitude, are uncertain.  Now in things doubtful and uncertain the reason does not pronounce judgment, without previous inquiry:  wherefore the reason must of necessity institute an inquiry before deciding on the objects of choice; and this inquiry is called counsel.  Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 2) that choice is the “desire of what has been already counselled.”

Reply Obj. 1:  When the acts of two powers are ordained to one another, in each of them there is something belonging to the other power:  consequently each act can be denominated from either power.  Now it is evident that the act of the reason giving direction as to the means, and the act of the will tending to these means according to the reason’s direction, are ordained to one another.  Consequently there is to be found something of the reason, viz. order, in that act of the will, which is choice:  and in counsel, which is an act of reason, something of the will—­both as matter (since counsel is of what man wills to do)—­and as motive (because it is from willing the end, that man is moved to take counsel in regard to the means).  And therefore, just as the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that choice “is intellect influenced by appetite,” thus pointing out that both concur in the act of choosing; so Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 22) that counsel is “appetite based on inquiry,” so as to show that counsel belongs, in a way, both to the will, on whose behalf and by whose impulsion the inquiry is made, and to the reason that executes the inquiry.