and we, Jeudwine’s 55th Division, were transferred to Watts’s XIX Corps which became part of Gough’s Fifth Army—­that famous general having arrived in Flanders.  While at Westbecourt we—­Stockwell’s 164 Brigade—­practised the Third Battle of Ypres in the open cornfields and amongst the numerous vegetable crops between Cormette and Boisdinghem.  When we got back to the Salient we understood Haig’s plan to be that Gough’s Army should smash forward from Ypres, that there should be a French Army on Gough’s left, and that Rawlinson’s Fourth Army should land upon, or push up, the Belgian Coast at precisely the same moment as Gough struck north from the Ypres Salient.  That plan commended itself to me as highly satisfactory.  But one always has to reckon with an enemy as well!  I do not know whether Armin got wind of it or not, but he effectively thwarted Haig by doing precisely the kind of thing I expected he would do.  Rawlinson’s Army was engaged and driven back at Nieuport, thus disorganizing his plans; and Ypres—­the other flank—­was intensely bombarded with high explosives and gas shells on that never-to-be-forgotten night of July 12-13.  The gas casualties in Ypres who were taken to hospital on July 13 were, I was told, 3,000!  A much higher figure than I thought at first.  A day or two after these events Gratton came in to us at the Ramparts and casually informed us that the Coast idea was postponed:  the battle was going to be fought north and south of Ypres only.  The Coast landing was going to take place later if the Third Battle of Ypres should prove a success—­of which, of course, no patriot could entertain any doubts!  Rawlinson was not ready.  Nieuport was to me sufficient explanation for that.  And Beatty was not ready!  That I do not understand.  I was very disappointed, indeed, when I heard this news, as I was not very hopeful as to the chance of success in any battle fought in the centre.  A flanking movement is, in my opinion, the best policy; and the original idea would have meant, if a landing had been effected, a triangular advance which would have left before Armin only two alternatives—­retreat or surrender.  But attrition seems to be far more in Robertson’s line than strategy!  So the Third Battle of Ypres has begun.  And, unless things change very quickly, I am bound to say that it is not a success.  So much for the general idea.

“During our twenty days in the Ypres Salient, from July 1 to July 20, we suffered very heavily in casualties; and when we came out we were certainly not strong enough to go into battle.  So while we were at Valley Camp, Watou, we were reinforced by large drafts.  And, in accordance with the above plans, we left Watou on the night of July 25 and marched to Query Camp, near Brandhoek, but on the left of the main road.  Here we remained awaiting ‘XY night.’  ‘Z day’ was the day on which the battle was to take place.  On ‘XY night’ we left Query Camp and took up our positions in our concentration trenches near