is probable and undisputed to the simply probable one.  To both of these, however, they prefer that which is probable, undisputed, and tested.  If, however, both those of the Academy and the Sceptics say that they believe certain things, there is an evident difference between the two schools of philosophy even in this; for “to believe” is used in a different sense, 230 meaning, on the one hand, not to resist, but simply to accept without strong inclination and approval, as the child is said to believe the teacher; on the other hand, “to believe” is used to signify assenting to something with choice, and, as it were, with the sympathy that accompanies strong will, as the prodigal follows the one who chooses to live a luxurious life.  Therefore, since Carneades, Clitomachus, and their followers say that they are strongly inclined to believe that a thing is probable, and we simply allow that it may be so without assent, we differ 231 from them, I think, in this way.  We differ from the New Academy likewise in things concerning the aim; for while the men who say that they govern themselves according to that School avail themselves of the idea of the probable in life, we live according to the laws and customs, and our natural feelings, in an unprejudiced way.  We could say more regarding the distinction between the two schools if we did not aim at brevity.  Nevertheless, Arcesilaus, who as we said was the leader and 232 chief of the Middle Academy, seems to me to have very much in common with the Pyrrhonean teachings, so that his school and ours are almost one.  For neither does one find that he expressed an opinion about the existence or non-existence of anything, nor does he prefer one thing to another as regards trustworthiness or untrustworthiness; he suspends his judgment regarding all things, and the aim of his philosophy is [Greek:  epoche], which is accompanied by [Greek:  ataraxia], and this agrees with what we have said.  But he calls the particular instances of 233 [Greek:  epoche] bona, and the particular instances of assent mala.  The difference is that we say these things according to what appears to us, and not affirmatively, while he says them as if speaking of realities, that is, he says that [Greek:  epoche] is in itself good, and assent an evil.  If we are to believe also the things that are said about him, he appeared at first 234 sight to be a Pyrrhonean, but he was in truth a Dogmatic, for he used to test his companions by the method of doubt to see whether they were gifted enough to take in Plato’s dogmas, so that he appeared to be a Sceptic, but at the same time he communicated the doctrines of Plato to those of his companions who were gifted.  Hence Ariston also said about him—­

   “Plato in front, Pyrrhon behind, Diodorus in the middle,”