term “judgment” by Aristotle, as being a recognition of the relativity of knowledge to the affirming mind.  I am not to say, absolutely, “Ice is cold”; I am to say that, to the best of my judgment or belief, or in so far as I am concerned, ice is cold.  This, however, has little to do with the logic of the syllogism, and not much with any logic.  So, when we speak of a “notion,” we must understand it as apprehended by some mind; but for nearly all purposes, this is assumed tacitly; it need not appear in a formal designation, which, not being wanted, is calculated to mislead.

* * * * *

[APPLIED OR DERIVATIVE SCIENCES.]

With these remarks on the two fundamental sciences of our group, I now turn to the applied or derivative sciences, wherein the great controversies stand out most conspicuous, which, in fact, exist for the purpose of contention—­Ontology and Ethics.  These branches were in request long before the mother sciences—­psychology and logic—­came into being at all.  They had occupied their chief positions without consulting the others, partly because these were not there to consult, and partly because they were not inclined to consult any extraneous authority.  By Ontology we may designate the standing controversies of the intellectual powers—­perception, innate ideas, nominalism versus realism, and noumenon versus phenomenon.  I am not going to pronounce upon these questions; I have already recommended the alternative mode of approaching them under systematic psychology and logic; and I will now regard them as constituents of the fourfold enumeration of the metaphysical sciences.

The Germans may be credited for teaching us, or trying to teach us, to distinguish “bread and butter” from what passes beyond, transcends bread and butter.  With them the distinction is thoroughly ingrained, and comes to hand at a moment’s notice.  If I am to review in detail what may be considered the practical or applied departments of logic and psychology, I am in danger of trenching on their “bread-and-butter” region.  Before descending, therefore, into the larder, let us first spend a few seconds in considering psychology as the pursuit of truth in all that relates to our mental constitution.  If difficulty be a stimulus to the human exertions, it may be found here.  To ascertain, fix, and embody the precise truth in regard to the facts of the mind is about as hard an undertaking as could be prescribed to a man.  But this is another way of saying that psychology is not a very advanced science; is not well stored with clear and certain doctrines; and is unable, therefore, to confer any very great precision on its dependent branches, whether purely speculative or practical.  In a word, the greatest modesty or humility is the deportment most becoming to all that engage in this field of labour, even when doing their best; while the same virtues in even greater measure are due from those engaging in it without doing their best.