Athenian:  Good, my friend; I may observe, however, in passing, that in music there certainly are figures and there are melodies:  and music is concerned with harmony and rhythm, so that you may speak of a melody or figure having good rhythm or good harmony—­the term is correct enough; but to speak metaphorically of a melody or figure having a ‘good colour,’ as the masters of choruses do, is not allowable, although you can speak of the melodies or figures of the brave and the coward, praising the one and censuring the other.  And not to be tedious, let us say that the figures and melodies which are expressive of virtue of soul or body, or of images of virtue, are without exception good, and those which are expressive of vice are the reverse of good.

Cleinias:  Your suggestion is excellent; and let us answer that these things are so.

Athenian:  Once more, are all of us equally delighted with every sort of dance?

Cleinias:  Far otherwise.

Athenian:  What, then, leads us astray?  Are beautiful things not the same to us all, or are they the same in themselves, but not in our opinion of them?  For no one will admit that forms of vice in the dance are more beautiful than forms of virtue, or that he himself delights in the forms of vice, and others in a muse of another character.  And yet most persons say, that the excellence of music is to give pleasure to our souls.  But this is intolerable and blasphemous; there is, however, a much more plausible account of the delusion.

Cleinias:  What?

Athenian:  The adaptation of art to the characters of men.  Choric movements are imitations of manners occurring in various actions, fortunes, dispositions,—­each particular is imitated, and those to whom the words, or songs, or dances are suited, either by nature or habit or both, cannot help feeling pleasure in them and applauding them, and calling them beautiful.  But those whose natures, or ways, or habits are unsuited to them, cannot delight in them or applaud them, and they call them base.  There are others, again, whose natures are right and their habits wrong, or whose habits are right and their natures wrong, and they praise one thing, but are pleased at another.  For they say that all these imitations are pleasant, but not good.  And in the presence of those whom they think wise, they are ashamed of dancing and singing in the baser manner, or of deliberately lending any countenance to such proceedings; and yet, they have a secret pleasure in them.

Cleinias:  Very true.

Athenian:  And is any harm done to the lover of vicious dances or songs, or any good done to the approver of the opposite sort of pleasure?

Cleinias:  I think that there is.

Athenian:  ‘I think’ is not the word, but I would say, rather, ’I am certain.’  For must they not have the same effect as when a man associates with bad characters, whom he likes and approves rather than dislikes, and only censures playfully because he has a suspicion of his own badness?  In that case, he who takes pleasure in them will surely become like those in whom he takes pleasure, even though he be ashamed to praise them.  And what greater good or evil can any destiny ever make us undergo?