lot, while by doing away with the political character of the popular assembly the mainspring of the machine is taken out.  The guardians of the law, thirty-seven in number, of whom the ten eldest reappear as a part of the Nocturnal Council at the end of the twelfth book, are to be elected by the whole military class, but they are to hold office for twenty years, and would therefore have an oligarchical rather than a democratic character.  Nothing is said of the manner in which the functions of the Nocturnal Council are to be harmonized with those of the guardians of the law, or as to how the ordinary council is related to it.

Similar principles are applied to inferior offices.  To some the appointment is made by vote, to others by lot.  In the elections to the priesthood, Plato endeavours to mix or balance in a friendly manner ’demus and not demus.’  The commonwealth of the Laws, like the Republic, cannot dispense with a spiritual head, which is the same in both—­the oracle of Delphi.  From this the laws about all divine things are to be derived.  The final selection of the Interpreters, the choice of an heir for a vacant lot, the punishment for removing a deposit, are also to be determined by it.  Plato is not disposed to encourage amateur attempts to revive religion in states.  For, as he says in the Laws, ’To institute religious rites is the work of a great intelligence.’

Though the council is framed on the model of the Athenian Boule, the law courts of Plato do not equally conform to the pattern of the Athenian dicasteries.  Plato thinks that the judges should speak and ask questions:  —­this is not possible if they are numerous; he would, therefore, have a few judges only, but good ones.  He is nevertheless aware that both in public and private suits there must be a popular element.  He insists that the whole people must share in the administration of justice—­in public causes they are to take the first step, and the final decision is to remain with them.  In private suits they are also to retain a share; ’for the citizen who has no part in the administration of justice is apt to think that he has no share in the state.  For this reason there is to be a court of law in every tribe (i.e. for about every 2,000 citizens), and the judges are to be chosen by lot.’  Of the courts of law he gives what he calls a superficial sketch.  Nor, indeed is it easy to reconcile his various accounts of them.  It is however clear that although some officials, like the guardians of the law, the wardens of the agora, city, and country have power to inflict minor penalties, the administration of justice is in the main popular.  The ingenious expedient of dividing the questions of law and fact between a judge and jury, which would have enabled Plato to combine the popular element with the judicial, did not occur to him or to any other ancient political philosopher.  Though desirous of limiting the number of judges, and thereby confining the office to persons specially fitted for it, he does not seem to have understood that a body of law must be formed by decisions as well as by legal enactments.