“From a knowledge of our Southern population, it is my solemn conviction that there is some danger of an early act of secession, viz.:  The seizure of some or all of the following posts:  Forts Jackson and St. Philip, on the Mississippi below New Orleans, both without garrisons; Fort Morgan, below Mobile, without garrison; Forts Pickens and McKee, Pensacola Harbor, with an insufficient garrison for one; Fort Pulaski, below Savannah, without a garrison; Forts Moultrie and Sumter, Charleston Harbor, the former with an insufficient garrison and the latter without any; and Fort Monroe, Hampton Roads, without a sufficient garrison.  In my opinion, all these works should be immediately so garrisoned as to make any attempt to take any one of them by surprise or coup de main ridiculous.

“With the army faithful to its allegiance and the navy probably equally so, and a Federal Executive for the next twelve months of firmness and moderation, which the whole country has a right to expect—­moderation being an element of power not less than firmness—­there is good reason to hope that the danger of secession may be made to pass away without one conflict of arms, one execution, or one arrest for treason.  In the meantime it is suggested that exports might be left perfectly free, and, to avoid conflicts, all duties on imports be collected outside of the cities in forts or ships of war.”

Again, October 31st, the general suggested to the Secretary of War that a circular should be sent at once to such of those forts as had garrisons to be on the alert against surprises and sudden assaults; but no notice seems to have been taken of the judicious and wise suggestion.

On December 12th General Scott arrived in Washington.  He had been confined to his bed for a long time and was physically very much depleted.  He again personally urged upon the Secretary of War the views expressed in his note from West Point of October 29th as to strengthening the forts in Charleston Harbor, Pensacola, Mobile, and the Mississippi River below New Orleans.  The Secretary did not concur in these views.  Finally General Scott called on the President, on December 15th, in company with the Secretary, and urged upon the chief Executive the importance of re-enforcing the forts mentioned; but no action was taken.  After the Secretary of War [Floyd] had resigned his position in the Cabinet he was given a reception in Richmond, which called out the remark from the Examiner, of that city, that if the plan invented by General Scott to stop secession had been carried out, and the arsenals and forts put in the condition he wanted them to be, “the Southern Confederacy would not now exist.”