But perhaps it will be said that I am caricaturing the Bolshevik doctrine of revolution.  It is urged by advocates of this doctrine, quite truly, that all political events are brought about by minorities, since the majority are indifferent to politics.  But there is a difference between a minority in which the indifferent acquiesce, and a minority so hated as to startle the indifferent into belated action.  To make the Bolshevik doctrine reasonable, it is necessary to suppose that they believe the majority can be induced to acquiesce, at least temporarily, in the revolution made by the class-conscious minority.  This, again, is based upon Russian experience:  desire for peace and land led to a widespread support of the Bolsheviks in November 1917 on the part of people who have subsequently shown no love for Communism.

I think we come here to an essential part of Bolshevik philosophy.  In the moment of revolution, Communists are to have some popular cry by which they win more support than mere Communism could win.  Having thus acquired the State machine, they are to use it for their own ends.  But this, again, is a method which can only be practised successfully so long as it is not avowed.  It is to some extent habitual in politics.  The Unionists in 1900 won a majority on the Boer War, and used it to endow brewers and Church schools.  The Liberals in 1906 won a majority on Chinese labour, and used it to cement the secret alliance with France and to make an alliance with Tsarist Russia.  President Wilson, in 1916, won his majority on neutrality, and used it to come into the war.  This method is part of the stock-in-trade of democracy.  But its success depends upon repudiating it until the moment comes to practise it.  Those who, like the Bolsheviks, have the honesty to proclaim in advance their intention of using power for other ends than those for which it was given them, are not likely to have a chance of carrying out their designs.

What seems to me to emerge from these considerations is this:  That in a democratic and politically educated country, armed revolution in favour of Communism would have no chance of succeeding unless it were supported by a larger majority than would be required for the election of a Communist Government by constitutional methods.  It is possible that, if such a Government came into existence, and proceeded to carry out its programme, it would be met by armed resistance on the part of capital, including a large proportion of the officers in the army and navy.  But in subduing this resistance it would have the support of that great body of opinion which believes in legality and upholds the constitution.  Moreover, having, by hypothesis, converted a majority of the nation, a Communist Government could be sure of loyal help from immense numbers of workers, and would not be forced, as the Bolsheviks are in Russia, to suspect treachery everywhere.  Under these circumstances, I believe that the resistance of the capitalists could be quelled without much difficulty, and would receive little support from moderate people.  Whereas, in a minority revolt of Communists against a capitalist Government, all moderate opinion would be on the side of capitalism.