History of Egypt, Chaldæa, Syria, Babylonia, and Assyria, Volume 9 (of 12) eBook

Gaston Maspero
This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 357 pages of information about History of Egypt, Chaldæa, Syria, Babylonia, and Assyria, Volume 9 (of 12).

History of Egypt, Chaldæa, Syria, Babylonia, and Assyria, Volume 9 (of 12) eBook

Gaston Maspero
This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 357 pages of information about History of Egypt, Chaldæa, Syria, Babylonia, and Assyria, Volume 9 (of 12).
* On this point Herodotus tells a current story of his time:  Thaies had a trench dug behind the army, which was probably encamped in one of the bends made by the Halys; he then diverted the stream into this new bed, with the result that the Lydians found themselves on the right bank of the river without having had the trouble of crossing it.

     ** Nicolas of Damascus records that Cyrus, after the capture
     of Sardes, for a short time contemplated making Croesus a
     vassal king, or at least a satrap of Lydia.

*** We have two very different accounts of this campaign, viz. that of Herodotus, and that of Polyonus.  According to Herodotus, Croesus gave battle only once in Pteria, with indecisive result, and on the next day quietly retired to his kingdom, thinking that Cyrus would not dare to pursue him.  According to Polyonus, Croesus, victorious in a first engagement owing to a more or less plausible military stratagem, consented to a truce, but on the day after was completely defeated, and obliged to return to his kingdom with a routed army.  Herodotus’ account of the fall of Croesus and of Sardes, borrowed partly from a good written source, Xanthus or Charon of Lampsacus, partly from the tradition of the Harpagidse, seems to have for its object the soothing of the vanity both of the Persians and of the Lydians, since, if the result of the war could not be contested, the issue of the battle was at least left uncertain.  If he has given a faithful account, no one can understand why Croesus should have retired and ceded White Syria to a rival who had never conquered him.  The account given by Polysenus, in spite of the improbability of some of its details, comes from a well-informed author:  the defeat of the Lydians in the second battle explains the retreat of Crcesus, who is without excuse in Herodotus’ version of the affair.  Pompeius Trogus adopted a version similar to that of Polysenus.

Cyrus employed the respite in attempting to win over the Greek cities of the littoral, which he pictured to himself as nursing a bitter hatred against the Mermnadae; but it is to be doubted if his emissaries succeeded even in wresting a declaration of neutrality from the Milesians; the remainder, Ionians and AEolians, all continued faithful to their oaths.* On the resumption of hostilities, the tide of fortune turned, and the Lydians were crushed by the superior forces of the Persians and the Medes; Crcesus retired under cover of night, burning the country as he retreated, to prevent the enemy from following him, and crossed the Halys with the remains of his battalions.  The season was already far advanced; he thought that the Persians, threatened in the rear by the Babylonian troops, would shrink from the prospect of a winter campaign, and he fell back upon Sardes without further lingering in Phrygia.  But Nabonidus did not feel himself called upon to show the same devotion that his ally had evinced towards him, or perhaps the priests who governed in his name did not permit him to fulfil his engagements.**

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History of Egypt, Chaldæa, Syria, Babylonia, and Assyria, Volume 9 (of 12) from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.