History of Egypt, Chaldæa, Syria, Babylonia, and Assyria, Volume 9 (of 12) eBook

Gaston Maspero
This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 357 pages of information about History of Egypt, Chaldæa, Syria, Babylonia, and Assyria, Volume 9 (of 12).

History of Egypt, Chaldæa, Syria, Babylonia, and Assyria, Volume 9 (of 12) eBook

Gaston Maspero
This eBook from the Gutenberg Project consists of approximately 357 pages of information about History of Egypt, Chaldæa, Syria, Babylonia, and Assyria, Volume 9 (of 12).
not in a position to take the town by storm; not only had the fortifications been doubled, but the banks of the canals had been cut and the approaches inundated.  Iphicrates advised him not to persevere in attempting a regular siege:  he contended that it would be more profitable to detach an expeditionary force towards some less well-protected point on the coast, and there to make a breach in the system of defence which protected the enemies’ front.

* As Kenrick justly observes, “the Persian and Athenian generals committed the same mistake which led to the defeat of Saint Louis and the capture of his army in 1249 A.D., and which Bonaparte avoided in his campaign of 1798.”  Anyhow, it seems that the fault must be laid on Pharnabazus alone, and that Iphicrates was entirely blameless.

Three thousand men were despatched with all secrecy to the mouth of the Mendesian branch of the Nile, and there disembarked unexpectedly before the forts which guarded the entrance.  The garrison, having imprudently made a sortie in face of the enemy, was put to rout, and pursued so hotly that victors and vanquished entered pell-mell within the walls.

[Illustration:  293.jpg ARTAXERXES II.]

     Drawn by Faucher-Gudin, from a silver stater in the Cabinet
     des Medailles
.

After this success victory was certain, if the Persians pursued their advantage promptly and pushed forward straight into the heart of the Delta; the moment was the more propitious for such a movement, since Nectanebo had drained Memphis of troops to protect his frontier.  Iphicrates, having obtained this information from one of the prisoners, advised Pharnabazus to proceed up the Nile with the fleet, and take the capital by storm before the enemy should have time to garrison it afresh; the Persian general, however, considered the plan too hazardous, and preferred to wait until the entire army should have joined him.  Iphicrates offered to risk the adventure with his body of auxiliary troops only, but was suspected of harbouring some ambitious design, and was refused permission to advance.  Meanwhile these delays had given the Egyptians time to recover from their first alarm; they boldly took the offensive, surrounded the position held by Pharnabazus, and were victorious in several skirmishes.  Summer advanced, the Nile rose more rapidly than usual, and soon the water encroached upon the land; the invaders were obliged to beat a retreat before it, and fall back towards Syria.  Iphicrates, disgusted at the ineptitude and suspicion of his Asiatic colleagues, returned secretly to Greece:  the remains of the army were soon after disbanded, and Egypt once more breathed freely.  The check received by the Persian arms, however, was not sufficiently notorious to shake that species of supremacy which Artaxerxes had exercised in Greece since the peace of 387.  Sparta, Thebes, and Athens vied with each other in obtaining an alliance

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History of Egypt, Chaldæa, Syria, Babylonia, and Assyria, Volume 9 (of 12) from Project Gutenberg. Public domain.