It is, however, quite true that a moralist, if he were so minded, might in Mr. Miller’s pages find abundant material for a series of homilies on the vanity of human wishes, and especially of diplomatic human wishes.  But would he on that account be right in pronouncing a wholesale condemnation of diplomacy?  Assuredly not.  Rather, the conclusion to be drawn from a review of past history is that a small number of very well-informed and experienced diplomatists showed remarkable foresight in perceiving the future drift of events.  So early as 1837 Lord Palmerston supported Milosh Obrenovitch II., the ruler of Servia, against Turkey, as he had “come to the conclusion that to strengthen the small Christian States of the Near East was the true policy of both Turkey and Great Britain.”  Similar views were held at a later period by Sir William White, and were eventually adopted by the Government of Lord Beaconsfield.  An equal amount of foresight was displayed by some Russian diplomatists.  In Lord Morley’s Life of Gladstone (vol. i. p. 479) a very remarkable letter is given, which was addressed to the Emperor Nicholas by Baron Brunnow, just before the outbreak of the Crimean War, in which he advocated peace on the ground that “war would not turn to Russian advantage....  The Ottoman Empire may be transformed into independent States, which for us will only become either burdensome clients or hostile neighbours.”  It may be that, as is now very generally thought, the Crimean War was a mistake, and that, in the classic words of Lord Salisbury, we “put our money on the wrong horse.”  But it is none the less true that had it not been for the Crimean War and the policy subsequently adopted by Lord Beaconsfield’s government, the independence of the Balkan States would never have been achieved, and the Russians would now be in possession of Constantinople.  It is quite permissible to argue that, had they been left unopposed, British interests would not have suffered; but even supposing this very debatable proposition to be true, it must be regarded, from an historical point of view, as at best an ex post facto argument.  British diplomacy has to represent British public opinion, and during almost the whole period of which Mr. Miller’s history treats, a cardinal article of British political faith was that, in the interests of Great Britain, Constantinople should not be allowed to fall into Russian hands.  The occupation of Egypt in 1882 without doubt introduced a new and very important element into the discussion.  The most serious as also the least excusable mistake in British Near-Eastern policy of recent years has been the occupation of Cyprus, which burthened us with a perfectly useless possession, and inflicted a serious blow on our prestige.  Sir Edward Grey’s recent diplomatic success is in a large measure due to the fact that all the Powers concerned were convinced of British disinterestedness.

[Footnote 81:  The Ottoman Empire, 1801-1913.  By W. Miller.  Cambridge:  At the University Press. 7s. 6d.]