always cared more about political machinery than about social reorganisation.  The gibe was never true.  But, in any case, no projects of social reorganisation have much chance of success unless the political machinery by means of which they have to be carried into effect is working efficiently.  Moreover, since most of the projects of social reform which are being urged upon our attention involve an enlargement of the activities of the State, it is obvious that we shall be running the risk of a breakdown unless we make sure that the machinery of the State is capable of meeting the demands which are made upon it.  We must be satisfied that our engine has sufficient power before we require it to draw a double load.  In truth, one reason why the engine of government is not working well is that it has been required to do a great deal more work than it was designed for.  The time has come to consider carefully the character and capacity of our machinery of government in view of the increased demands which are certain to be made upon it in the future.

Our national political system may be divided into two parts.  On the one hand, there is the working machine, which goes on, year in, year out, whether Parliament is sitting or not, and which would still go on quite well for a time if Parliament never met again.  We call it the Government, and we habitually and rightly hold it responsible for every aspect of national policy and action, for legislation and finance as well as for foreign policy and internal administration.  On the other hand, there is what Burke used to call “the control on behalf of the nation,” mainly exercised through Parliament, whose chief function is to criticise and control the action of Government, and to make the responsibility of Government to the nation a real and a felt responsibility.  The discontents of to-day apply to both parts of the system, and I propose to deal with them in turn, first inquiring what is wrong with the working machine of government and how it can be amended, and then turning to consider how far the control on behalf of the nation is working badly, and how it can be made more efficient.

In what I have called the “working machine” of government there are two distinct elements.  First, there is the large, permanent, professional staff, the Civil Service; secondly, there is the policy-directing body, the Cabinet.  Both of these are the objects of a great deal of contemporary criticism.  On the one hand, we are told that we are suffering from “bureaucracy,” which means that the permanent officials have too much independent and uncontrolled, or imperfectly controlled, authority.  On the other hand, we are told that we are suffering from Cabinet dictatorship, or, alternatively, that the Cabinet system is breaking down and being replaced by the autocracy of the Prime Minister.  There is a good deal of prima facie justification for all these complaints.

THE GROWTH OF THE CIVIL SERVICE